

# **The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005**

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**Lawrence A. Yates**




## **Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 15**



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## Foreword

This Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper (GWOT OP), by Dr. Lawrence Yates, provides his thoughts and analysis of the US Army's participation in stability operations (SO) since 1789. Dr. Yates, a member of the CSI Team since 1981, has spent twenty plus years intensely studying this aspect of Army operations. Prior to his retirement in 2005, CSI asked him to put in writing his impressions formed by his research in this field. The result is this monograph.

Dr. Yates makes several key arguments about the Army's involvement in SO. Among the key points he makes is his contention that the Army has an institutional habit of forgetting the lessons learned about SO, when, after conducting a stability operation, it returns to conventional warfare preparation. He also points out, correctly, that the Army, which has participated in far more SO-type activities since 1789 than it has conventional wars, has hitherto retained a mindset that stability operations are the anomaly rather than the norm in American military operations. It is our hope that this GWOT OP will be of great value in providing the military professional with a broad overview of the history of the US Army's participation in stability operations, and at least one historian's view on how well it performed. Some may disagree with Dr. Yates' views on specific aspects of his analysis; that is well and good. If this GWOT OP stimulates a vigorous debate, Dr. Yates' study will have achieved its purpose. *CSI—The Past is Prologue*.

Timothy R. Reese  
Colonel, Armor  
Director, Combat Studies Institute



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## Introduction

According to US Army Field Manual 3.0, *Operations*, “Fighting and winning the nation’s wars is the foundation of Army service....” Thus, even though the Army recognizes that soldiers will perform a wide range of military activities across the *spectrum of conflict*, the service’s institutional emphasis is on *warfighting*.<sup>1</sup> This focus is narrowed even further when considering war itself. Officially, the Army describes war as a phenomenon that takes on many forms, including large and small, total and limited, global and regional, conventional and unconventional. Yet, in the past, warfighting doctrine, supported by military education and training programs and reflecting the Army’s institutional biases, has instilled the conviction in most officers that, despite war’s diversity, “real” war is primarily a *conventional* undertaking—one in which the regular armed forces of a given state wage large-scale and sustained combat operations against the regular armed forces of an enemy state. In conventional warfare, the battlefield tends to be linear, the armies large, the combatants uniformed (and thus identifiable), and the technology highly sophisticated. The mission of the US military in such wars is to defeat the enemy’s forces, or at least to inflict unacceptable damage on them, so that American policy makers can achieve the political objectives of a given conflict.

In the more than two centuries since “thirteen united States of America” declared their independence, American forces have fought 11 wars that were, by the aforementioned description, predominantly conventional in nature. Of those conflicts, four were total wars (the War of Independence, the Civil War, and World Wars I and II), in which America’s existence or its way of life was considered to be at stake, and in which few restrictions were placed on the weapons employed or on the targets attacked in the military’s efforts to defeat the enemy. The remaining seven wars (the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Spanish-American War, the Korean and Vietnam wars,<sup>2</sup> and the two Gulf wars) were limited, in that an imminent threat to the country’s survival or way of life was not apparent, thereby allowing US policy makers to accept or set limitations on the objectives, the geographical scope, and the conduct of hostilities. Throughout its history, the American military has focused the bulk of its attention on fighting, or preparing to fight, these kinds of conventional wars, with circumstances dictating whether any given conflict would be total or limited.

One trade off for this preoccupation with conventional warfare has been the military’s general disinclination to study and prepare for what, in current jargon, is referred to as *stability operations*. As of this writing,

Army doctrine for full spectrum operations (offense, defense, stability, and civil support operations) and for the narrower categories of stability operations and counterinsurgency is being rewritten. The current working draft of the field manual for stability operations contains the following generalization:

A stability *operation* is an operation executed outside the United States and its territories to establish, preserve, and exploit security and control over areas, populations, and resources. They may occur before, during, and after offensive and defensive operations; however, they also occur separately, usually at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. Army forces engaged in stability operations establish, safeguard, or restore basic civil services. They act directly and in support of government agencies. Stability operations involve both coercive and cooperative actions. They lead to an environment in which the other instruments of national power can predominate.<sup>3</sup>

In the past, the following kinds of activities have fallen under the rubric of stability operations<sup>4</sup>:

- Peace operations
- Foreign internal defense (to include counterinsurgency)
- Security assistance
- Humanitarian and civic assistance
- Support to insurgencies
- Support to counterdrug operations
- Combating terrorism
- Noncombatant evacuation operations
- Arms control
- Show of force

If America's armed forces have fought fewer than a dozen major conventional wars in over two centuries, they have, during that same period, engaged in several hundred military undertakings that would today be characterized as stability operations.<sup>5</sup> The Army was involved in many of these; as an institution, however, it developed, in the words of analyst James Carafano, "a tradition of forgetting" its own experience.<sup>6</sup> The primary reason for this is simple enough: throughout most of its history, the Army has regarded stability operations as "someone else's job," an unwanted burden, a series of sideshows that soldiers performed either separately from war or in the wake of war. Because the Army did not gener-

ally perceive stability operations as integral to war, such operations were belittled for diverting essential resources away from the service's principal mission of warfighting. On occasion, critics of this traditional view urged the Army to alter its doctrine and training programs so that combat units would have the skills both to fight and to conduct stability operations. In countering this recommendation, the Army often employed the argument that disciplined soldiers trained solely for warfighting were capable of adjusting to the unorthodox tasks and activities required by stability operations. Whatever the merit of this position, it tended to ignore or play down the disruption to the military mission and the cost to US policy objectives caused by the required period of adjustment.

It is hoped that this historical perspective might act as a mild antidote to the Army's recurring memory lapses regarding its experience in stability operations, as well as to the traditionalist mind set that fosters such lapses, the following pages provide a brief overview of the US military's involvement in such operations and draws out the salient patterns and recurring themes that can be derived from those experiences. It is hoped that a presentation and critical analysis of the historical record will assist today's Army in its attempts, now well under way, to reassess its long-standing attitudes toward stability operations and the role it should play in them.

## **Historical Overview**

For the sake of convenience, the US military's experience in the conduct of stability operations prior to the Global War on Terrorism can be divided chronologically into four periods: the country's first century (1789-1898); the "Small Wars" experience (1898-1940)<sup>7</sup>; the Cold War (1945-1990); and the post-Cold War decade (1991-2001). In providing an overview of each period, and in discussing the salient patterns and recurring themes derived from this overview, reference will be made to a group of 28 representative case studies. The list of these case studies can be found at appendix A; synopses of the cases, written by members of the Combat Studies Institute, are located in appendix B.

### **The First Century, 1789-1898**

With the exception of the war with Mexico in 1846, most major operations of the US Army during the first century of its existence took place within what were or would become the continental borders of the United States. Of the operations that could be characterized as stability operations today, the least violent tended to be those associated with building and securing the country's infrastructure. "In this surge of national development,"

write Peter Maslowski and Allan Millett, “the Army served as an advance agent of continental empire. Soldiers explored the West and built, improved, and protected transportation networks. Communities arose in the vicinity of forts where bluecoats provided security and consumed goods and services.” West Point graduates, the authors go on to say, were able to apply the scientific and engineering skills they had acquired at the Academy to the task of national development.<sup>8</sup>

During this period of territorial expansion and development, the Army also engaged in law enforcement, at times to deter or quell violent activities by groups of disgruntled citizens, but more extensively in the area of Indian affairs.<sup>9</sup> Prior to the Civil War, this meant keeping peace in frontier areas and removing eastern Indian tribes to territory in the trans-Mississippi West. Often, these duties necessitated only a show of force, either to keep Indians and white settlers from engaging in hostilities or, under the US government’s removal policy, to escort the tribes to their new land and help them settle it. When hostilities against an Indian foe did break out, the Army often relied on conventional tactics, deploying in converging columns in order to surround the enemy and force him to fight a decisive battle. In the Second Seminole War (1835-1842), however, the policy of Indian removal took US forces into the swamps of Florida, where the troops became bogged down in the country’s first protracted unconventional war. Constrained by the terrain and plagued by the raiding and ambush tactics of small Seminole war parties, American commanders enjoyed little military success until they, too, adopted unconventional, small-unit tactics designed to bring the war parties to battle or run them to ground. In the list of eight generals who commanded US troops in Florida, only two, Zachary Taylor and William Worth, did so with distinction, while others asked to be relieved from their involvement in a messy undertaking they regarded as unworthy of a true officer and warrior.<sup>10</sup>

Beginning shortly before the Civil War and continuing into the 1890s, the Army’s involvement in Indian affairs shifted largely to the trans-Mississippi West, specifically to the country’s Great Plains, Northwest, and Southwest, where US soldiers engaged in a variety of activities, including pacification and police work. As had been the case in the first half of the century, battles and skirmishes with the Indians involved a combination of conventional and unconventional warfare, the latter necessitating that the Army adopt such unorthodox measures as small, lightly armed, and highly mobile forces, and the use of Indian auxiliaries. By the end of the century, when the United States was

deemed to have fulfilled its “Manifest Destiny” upon the North American continent, the Army had acquired an impressive record in the conduct of irregular warfare against opponents who, fighting in accord with their cultural norms, had proved challenging and formidable. In the process, US soldiers had also played a critical role in developing the country’s transportation and communication systems, conducting scientific surveys and studies, promoting local education, and stimulating economic growth.

On occasion in the period between 1789 and 1898, the US military engaged in what it considered to be genuine—meaning conventional—warfare: the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Civil War. While remembered for their large-scale battles between uniformed combatants, these conflicts also had their unconventional aspects, with each requiring soldiers to perform a variety of tasks not directly related to combat on the battlefield. In the case of the war in Mexico, the Army’s strategic plans and battlefield successes meant that, until the conflict ended, it would have to occupy large areas of a foreign country. With no international guidelines to follow, the Army’s general-in-chief, Winfield Scott, devised occupation policies that initially emphasized conciliation toward the Mexican people and local officials. US military governors enacted programs to feed the poor, promote sanitation, and support public institutions. Local elections took place on schedule, and the local judiciary continued to function. When, however, guerrilla bands began disrupting US supply lines and ambushing US patrols, American military governors did not hesitate to respond with harsh measures against the guerrillas, who could be summarily executed, and against civilians supportive of guerrilla activities, who could be fined or have their homes and other property destroyed. This combination of reconciliation and retribution would later influence the development of the Union’s policies for occupied areas during the American Civil War.<sup>11</sup>

In that internecine conflict, large numbers of Union troops were engaged in occupying border states and territory captured from the Confederacy. President Abraham Lincoln established military governments in most occupied secessionist states and, mindful of the disastrous “people’s war,” or *guerrilla*, that Napoleon had been forced to fight in Spain, sought the implementation of moderate policies that would not provoke armed resistance. In translating the president’s lenient intentions into practice, Army officers in occupied areas sought to establish order by creating police forces and civilian judicial systems, though military courts in some areas were compelled to preside over civil affairs. Military officials also supervised elections, collected taxes, regulated economic matters and business affairs, and engaged

in humanitarian and sanitation efforts to ease the plight of a war-afflicted population.

Despite the Army's initial implementation of moderate policies, much of the population in the border states and the Union-controlled South were hostile toward the occupying federal forces. That hostility manifested itself in a variety of ways, from passive resistance to violent attempts to sabotage occupation efforts. In several areas, resistance took the form of pro-Confederate guerrilla movements. Confronted with this irregular warfare and the popular support it engendered, Union policies toward the rebel guerrillas and their local sympathizers grew harsher as the war progressed, a pattern reminiscent of the Army's experience in Mexico. Only in April 1863, with the promulgation of General Order No. 100, did occupying forces receive official guidelines for dealing with recalcitrant civilians and the various categories of partisan fighters captured by the troops. Overall, the document called for moderation in occupation policies, but sanctioned a progression of more stringent measures when the situation warranted. As for the Union officers and troops who had signed up to fight rebels, occupation duty involved them in a variety of administrative, security, and counter-guerrilla tasks and risks for which they had not been adequately prepared.<sup>12</sup>

The war ended in April 1865, and with the postwar draw down of the military, only Regular Army units would be available to occupy the war-torn and defeated South. Among the soldiers in place in mid-1865, there existed a shared expectation that they would perform some security and humanitarian tasks and then move on to other duties by the end of the year. To the surprise of many, however, reconstruction of the South would take three times longer than the Civil War itself. The unrepentant behavior of recalcitrant Southerners incurred the wrath of congressional Republicans, who, in alliance with top US Army commanders, passed legislation rejecting President Andrew Johnson's plan for a conciliatory and rapid reconstruction, and adopted instead a more ambitious program for transforming nearly all aspects of Southern life.

The legislation passed in 1867 and virtually put the Army in complete control of implementing reconstruction, answerable to no civil authority save Congress. Invoking martial law and applying an administrative model used in US territories, federal troops in five military districts—later changed to three territorial departments—maintained order and provided security. At the same time, they initiated comprehensive measures designed to set up new state governments, hold elections, ensure the rights and welfare of the newly freed slaves, and revolutionize much of the

South's economic infrastructure and social relationships. The timetable of results varied from district to district, but by 1871, all former rebel states had been readmitted to the Union, albeit with reconstructed governments and a social system deeply resented by many Southerners. When this resentment took the form of guerrilla warfare, the Army was called upon to deal with the perpetrators. Efforts to subdue such terrorist organizations as the Ku Klux Klan, however, met with limited success. There were simply too few federal troops left in the South during the 1870s to counter the guerrilla threat, and restored state militias were ill-prepared to suppress the armed bands of irregulars. Thus, a military solution to the problem appeared unlikely, while the rancor and deep divisions in Southern politics and society obviated any political compromise.

Within a decade after the Civil War, much of what the Army had accomplished in reconstructing the South stood in jeopardy. As General William T. Sherman somberly noted, the Army did not have the power to change the feelings of most white Southerners, nor could it subjugate the South in perpetuity. With popular support for Reconstruction waning in the North and a new wave of anti-Republican "white terror" sweeping the South in the mid-1870s, the federal occupation ended in 1877. Within a few years, what was left of the Army-supported Republican governments had been overthrown,<sup>13</sup> and the Army's leadership had quickly put the whole Reconstruction experience behind it. Consequently, at century's end, when US soldiers became involved in setting up military occupations and governments overseas, many of the lessons that the Army could have applied from its Mexican War, Civil War, and post-Civil War occupation experiences had been largely forgotten.

### **The Small Wars Experience, 1898-1940**

By the mid-1890s the United States had completed its continental expansion, had emerged as the world's foremost industrial power, and stood postured to play a more active role in world affairs. When, in 1898, the country declared war on Spain, the decision inaugurated a new era in American history. From that point down to the present day, US land forces would be engaged overseas on a continuous basis. As for the reasons behind the Spanish-American War, the complex motives included a desire on the part of the United States to liberate the Cuban people from their harsh colonial masters and to restore a degree of stability in a country and a region deemed critical to America's strategic and economic interests. For the US military, the war was a conventional undertaking, aimed at defeating Spanish power in the Caribbean and the Pacific. In that Spain no longer retained the great power status it once enjoyed, an American victory was

not only inevitable but secured in a relative short time. With the peace agreement that formally ended the war, the United States found itself in control of Cuba and Puerto Rico in the Caribbean and the Philippines and a number of small islands in the Pacific.

In postwar Cuba, Washington imposed a military government that sought to clean up the country and refashion its political, economic, social, and military institutions in America's image. One of the key figures in this effort was Major General Leonard Wood, who served as a military governor, first over Cuba's Santiago Province and later over the whole island. In this capacity, he initiated public works, health, and sanitation programs, replaced the Spanish education system with one based on US models, reformed penal, legal, and judicial procedures, organized and trained a national military, set up civil administration throughout the island, and helped the Cubans form political parties, draft a constitution (one article of which relegated Cuba to the status of an American protectorate), and hold elections. When the military government ended in 1902, US officials hoped that they were leaving behind an Americanized island that would serve as a political and economic model for other countries in the region. Tempering these sentiments, though, were concerns that a combination of Cuba's inexperience in self-government and the remnants of Spanish colonial culture would undermine the American reforms. Within five years of Cuban independence, these fears were realized, as factional fighting and economic malfeasance on the island led to renewed instability, resulting in a US reoccupation of Cuba from 1906 to 1909.<sup>14</sup>

Halfway around the world, the war with Spain put an end to Spanish rule in the Philippines and led to the annexation of the archipelago by the United States. During the period of military government that followed, US troops duplicated much of what Wood had accomplished in Cuba in the way of health and sanitation, public works, judicial and penal reform, and other initiatives. But unlike Cuba, the fact that the Philippines were slated to become an American colony triggered a widespread uprising of Filipino nationalists opposed to a renewal of foreign rule. The resulting US-Philippine War began in 1899 as a conventional conflict, but after a succession of American victories, most Filipino belligerents chose to adopt guerrilla tactics. Consequently, US soldiers and marines, who excelled in the conventional phase of the war, had to adapt to irregular warfare, discovering in the process that the insurgency varied in motivation, organization, composition, and tactics from one locale to another. That revelation put the onus for devising effective counter-guerrilla measures squarely on US small-unit commanders at the local level. Between 1900 and 1902, as each commander adapted to the

unique challenges he faced in his area of responsibility, American forces imposed a potent combination of benevolent policies and ruthless measures that succeeded in reducing the local guerrilla forces in the northern islands to near ineffectiveness. Once the US troops pacified an area, control passed into the hands of American civilian administrators.

As this process neared its end in the north, the military turned its attention to the southern islands, where, in America's first major attempt to control a significant Muslim population, US officers such as Wood and Brigadier General John J. Pershing sought to impose order and colonial rule over the indigenous Moros. Pershing, more than Wood, immersed himself in Moro culture and used this awareness to assert US authority through negotiation and in ways that would least offend the locals. Both Wood and Pershing, however, used force to counter armed challenges to US policies. By 1913 the Philippine Islands had been stabilized; they would remain an American colony until granted independence in 1946.<sup>15</sup>

Between 1900 and 1941, the United States intervened in one major conflict, the Great War, and several Small Wars. Of the lesser interventions, one occurred as part of an international punitive expedition in China during the Boxer Rebellion and another as a coalition undertaking in Russia toward the close of World War I. Most US interventions, however, took place in countries bordering or in the Caribbean Sea, generally for the purpose of maintaining or restoring stability within the region. In 1914, for example, President Woodrow Wilson ordered American forces into the coastal Mexican city of Veracruz, the first move in a plan designed to help liberate Mexico from the dictatorship of Victoriano Huerta. But the country was in the throes of a major revolution, and even Huerta's opponents denounced the US incursion. When Mexican troops in the city suffered high casualties resisting the American incursion, a shocked Wilson called off the US Army's planned march on Mexico City. His decision transformed the intervention into a US occupation of Veracruz.

To their dismay, American soldiers in the port city found themselves performing the routine humanitarian, governmental, economic, social, judicial, penal, and security tasks similar to those carried out by their predecessors in Cuba and the Philippines 15 years earlier. The resulting reforms dramatically transformed Veracruz, but the Americanization of the city did not survive the departure of the US troops later that year. With the Americans gone, traditional ways of doing business resurfaced, while many Mexicans who had collaborated with the occupiers faced severe penalties once revolutionary forces moved into the city.<sup>16</sup>

After the Veracruz affair, the responsibility for policing and stabilizing the Caribbean region fell primarily to the US Marine Corps. In 1915 the Marines entered Haiti for a near 20-year stay, and in 1916 they began an eight-year occupation of the Dominican Republic. In the mid-1920s marines intervened in Nicaragua to end a civil war between various political strongmen and their armed militias. In all cases the interventions provoked armed opposition, which, as in the Philippines, generally went through a conventional phase before the indigenous forces shifted to guerrilla tactics in order to offset the US advantage in firepower, discipline, and conventional tactics. In the case of the Sandino affair in Nicaragua, there was another parallel with the Philippines, as the marines fared best when they, too, adopted the guerrilla tactics of their foe. One particularly effective counter-guerrilla unit was Lieutenant "Chesty" Puller's small, lightly armed, and highly mobile M Company, composed of two marines and a few dozen members of the Nicaraguan *guardia nacional*.<sup>17</sup>

The *guardia nacional* in Nicaragua had been organized and trained by the marines, as had similar organizations in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. When coupled with the US blueprint for each country to establish democratic institutions and processes, the creation of an indigenous *national* military establishment loyal to a country's *institutions* and not to its political and military strongmen served as a key element in America's blanket formula for creating models of stability in underdeveloped countries. Unfortunately, the formula rarely worked. As Max Boot has observed, "The marines had tried hard to plant constitutional government but found it would not take root in the inhospitable soil of Hispaniola." During the Small War period, only the Philippines came close to living up to Washington's expectations. In Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, the national armies or police forces created by American soldiers and marines did contribute to their country's security, but not as defenders of democratic institutions and values. Rather, they fostered stability by becoming instruments of repression in the service of a succession of national dictators.<sup>18</sup>

In the mid-1930s the Great Depression and escalating violence in Europe and the Far East forced the United States to begin withdrawing its forces from Haiti and Nicaragua and to refrain from intervening in other Caribbean countries. As the Small War era drew to a close, the Marine Corps and, to a small degree, the Army tried to capture the lessons they had learned. The most notable product of this undertaking was the Marine Corps' *Small War Manual*, a compendium of information published in its final form in 1940.<sup>19</sup> While much contained in the manual is antiquated,

much remains relevant to US military personnel today. At the time of the manual's publication, however, the Marines put it on the shelf and hoped it would remain there, as the Corps, like the Army, turned its attention back to fighting large conventional wars. With the attack on Pearl Harbor, the kind of war both services preferred to fight came to pass.

## **The Cold War, 1945-1990**

As World War II came to an end in 1945, the stage was set for what became known as the Cold War, a superpower struggle waged partly in terms of power politics, partly in terms of universal ideologies. In 1945 the two principal antagonists, the United States and the Soviet Union, confronted each other in the center of war-torn Europe, as American and Russian troops (along with the British and French) occupied their assigned sectors of defeated Germany, Austria, and other former Axis countries. By 1947 the administration of President Harry Truman perceived a threat of Soviet military and ideological expansion into Western Europe and reacted by formulating a policy of containment. Three years later, this policy was extended to the Far East, after Mao Tzedong's revolutionary movement in China took control of the mainland and, in June 1950, war broke out on the Korean peninsula, precipitating US and UN intervention. In the mid-1950s the Middle East, too, became a part of the Cold War calculus, and by the 1960s most of the world had become an ideological or military battleground between East and West.

The Cold War, therefore, was a global conflict as much as World War I and World War II. But the beginnings, as noted, were in Europe, where the key to American strategy was rebuilding a devastated Germany in the zones of Western occupation. In 1942 the US military had begun planning that occupation, had established a school of military government, and had placed officers versed in civil affairs on the headquarter staffs at divisions and higher. These anticipatory initiatives seemed impressive, but most were inadequately resourced, as the manpower and materiel needs of those US units essential to combat operations received top priority. Once Allied forces entered Germany, US troops began administering German towns in rear areas. When the country fell, it was the combat forces on the scene that initially performed the myriad of security and humanitarian tasks that the situation urgently demanded, even though the troops were poorly prepared, poorly equipped, and poorly trained for these functions. That a considerable friction developed between the soldiers coming off months of combat and an unrepentant German population did not help matters. (In 1946 a specially formed US constabulary force would take over many occupation duties from regular units. Initial recruits for the constabulary

were combat veterans, but as they redeployed, younger men trained in police and border control methods and operations took their place.)

Contrary to the worst-case predictions of Allied planners, no significant internal resistance materialized as Allied troops occupied an enemy country whose government they had deposed, whose cities and infrastructure lay in ruin, and whose population—to include large numbers of refugees—lacked homes and the basics of life. Under the auspices of an Allied Control Council (ACC), the US military government under Army General Lucius Clay launched a comprehensive program of disarmament, demilitarization, denazification, democratization, and economic and financial reform within the American zone of western Germany and the US sector of Berlin. American military specialists vetted German officials, helped establish democratic political parties, worked with local and state agencies on civil affairs issues, participated in the international tribunal that tried Nazi leaders, and, in general, helped set the country on the road to political, economic, and social recovery and reform. Occupation programs were ambitious and difficult at times to implement, but progress was abetted by the fact that Germany, despite its feudal heritage and dictatorial experiences, had known several decades of constitutional government, produced a highly industrialized capitalist economy, and legislated far-reaching social reforms. In short there was no unbridgeable cultural chasm separating Germany from the Western occupying powers that could have doomed the long-term prospects for any reconstruction effort.

Worsening relations between the Soviet Union and the West became a significant factor in the direction American occupation policies took, as, in the words of one analyst, “Germany came to be seen more as a potential ally than as a defeated enemy.”<sup>20</sup> As the Russians pursued their own aims in their occupation zone, the Americans and the British merged each of theirs into the Bizone in January 1947. (For a variety of reasons, the French waited to join in 1949.) The Marshall Plan, designed to bolster all European economies, certainly helped that of western Germany, while the massive US-British airlift of supplies to west Berliners isolated by a Soviet blockade in 1948 and 1949 did much to transform US-German interaction from one of “victors and vanquished” to one of “friends and allies.” In 1949 the Western powers agreed to the establishment of a Federal Republic of Germany, or West Germany. After the outbreak of the Korean War the following year, the West German government’s rearmament and subsequent membership in NATO completed the process of turning America’s erstwhile enemy into a staunch Cold War ally.<sup>21</sup>

The success of Western stability operations and nation building in

Germany was duplicated in Japan, although the process often differed considerably. For one thing, the United States exercised almost sole control over reform and rebuilding efforts in postwar Japan, despite the illusion, perpetuated by the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, that other Allied countries that had fought the Japanese were also involved. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur oversaw the occupation and, considering himself an expert on the Asian mind, allowed several concessions to Japanese sensibilities and culture as he moved to transform the country's political and economic systems. In perhaps the most controversial decision of the occupation, the United States retained Japan's emperor on the grounds that, having renounced his claim to divinity, his support for the occupation would translate into general public acceptance. Otherwise, as in Germany, a number of prominent military and political officials were tried for war crimes.

In the first days of the occupation, MacArthur addressed the urgent humanitarian and administrative needs that the Allied bombing campaign, blockade, and subsequent victory had created within the country. Not surprising, one of the first accomplishments of the occupation was to establish an effective food distribution network. In terms of more far-reaching programs, the US occupation worked to demilitarize and democratize Japan. With the emperor's backing, the first goal, the demobilization of all Japanese military forces, proved fairly easy to achieve. The process of democratization and liberalization, which aimed at social, economic, and political reform at all levels of Japanese society, was exceedingly more complicated and took much longer to accomplish. Land reform, economic reorganization, the rewriting of the country's constitution, and the holding of free elections in 1947 represented significant milestones along the way. By the late 1940s, however, measures to hold a defeated enemy in permanent check were being balanced against Cold War considerations, as Washington came to view Japan as critical to the US policy of containing communism in the Far East. Thus, when the United States concluded a peace treaty with Japan in 1951, it also signed a defense agreement that, in effect, made the former enemy a Cold War ally.<sup>22</sup>

To the west, across the Sea of Japan, US forces in late 1945 had moved onto the southern portion of the Korean peninsula below the 38th parallel, a hurried reaction to the movement of Soviet forces into northern Korea in the last days of the war. As was the case in Germany, the Cold War transformed what was to have been a temporary administrative division of the country into two separate political entities, Kim Il-sung's communist regime in the north and, in the Republic of Korea (ROK), or South Korea,

the right-wing government of Syngman Rhee. When the US occupation of South Korea ended in 1949, Washington left behind a Korean Military Advisory Group to improve and strengthen the ROK army. Besides the threat of an invasion from the north, the fledgling military had to cope with an active, largely communist-led guerrilla campaign in the south, which, although giving South Korean soldiers experience in counterinsurgency, did so at the expense of the time they needed to acquire basic training skills. All the while, Washington tried in vain to hold in check both Kim's and Rhee's desire to reunite the peninsula by force.<sup>23</sup>

At the same time Germany, Japan, and South Korea were being rebuilt and transformed into US allies, Washington found itself beset by a variety of Cold War crises. One involved the communist-led insurgency in Greece that, through guerrilla warfare based in the country's northern mountains, sought to overthrow a right-wing Royalist regime in Athens. In the Philippines the communist Huk movement, which had fought Japanese occupation forces during World War II, now sought, through guerrilla warfare, to extend their control over the archipelago. In both cases, the United States responded to the threat of communist expansion with military and economic aid and military advisory groups. In Greece US military advisers generally advocated the use of conventional doctrine, force structure, and weaponry to counter the insurgents. The Greek guerrillas, for their part, proved obliging by prematurely and unwisely adopting conventional tactics. The outcome was a military victory for the American-supported regime in Athens. As for the Philippines, the country's defense minister and, later, president, Ramón Magsaysay, took American advice and equipment, but also initiated the political, economic, and military reforms necessary to marginalize the Huks. Helping to run the guerrillas to ground were the highly mobile counterinsurgency units and small hunter-killer teams that Magsaysay had approved. In short, US aid and military advisers in both Greece and the Philippines helped friendly governments defeat communist-led insurgencies and establish some degree of political stability.<sup>24</sup>

The West's list of early Cold War successes did not include the Korean War, a conventional but limited conflict that broke out in June 1950 and, for the next three years, committed US forces to fighting on the peninsula. The war took its toll in manpower and diverted precious resources to a country the Pentagon had not identified as one whose security was vital to America's national interests. The conflict ended in a costly stalemate along battle lines that approximated the status quo ante bellum, one of several facts that raised the American public's level of

frustration with the war. By the time an armistice was signed in mid-1953, the new administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower had already acted on its determination not to embroil American armed forces in another such “brushfire” war. For the remainder of the decade, the New Look, as the administration labeled its military strategy (others dubbed it “massive retaliation”), relied heavily on the country’s nuclear arsenal to deter or defeat communist aggression. By the late 1950s, however, the Soviet Union’s acquisition of effective delivery systems for its own nuclear weapons had undermined America’s strategic deterrence, thus keeping the door ajar for limited conventional wars and insurgencies. These conflicts would most likely be local or regional in scope and, in many cases, part of the process of decolonization that followed World War II. They might also reflect decades or centuries old religious, tribal, and ethnic tensions and divisions within a given area.

Such was the case in Lebanon in 1958, when sectarian strife within the country was aggravated by the appeal of radical Pan-Arab nationalism propagated by Egypt and Syria throughout the Arab Middle East. The Kremlin supported Cairo’s call for the overthrow of pro-Western governments in the region, creating fear in Washington that the resulting instability would open the door further to Soviet influence. Thus in mid-July 1958, when a nationalistic element within the Iraqi military deposed the pro-Western government in Baghdad and slaughtered the royal family, Eisenhower immediately ordered US troops into Lebanon to shore up a friendly government that was literally under fire from its domestic opponents, many of whom espoused Pan-Arab nationalism. American forces arriving in the country anticipated a fight with the Syrian army, which they believed was marching on Beirut. When the US command found that regular Syrian units were not in Lebanon, the likelihood of large-scale combat operations diminished. Instead, American soldiers and marines would engage in a show of force, asserting their presence in a peaceful but demonstrative way so that American negotiators could help end Lebanon’s internal crisis through diplomacy. Working closely with the Lebanese army and under very strict rules of engagement (ROE), US troops conducted patrols, manned checkpoints, engaged in psychological operations (PSYOP), and helped contain the bulk of the antigovernment forces until a political settlement was negotiated with the Levant’s warlords and armed militia groups, which included the Druze, Maronite and Orthodox Christians, and Sunni and Shia Muslims. By October when the last of the US forces left Beirut, stability had been restored in Lebanon, the regional situation seemed improved, and Soviet initiatives in the area had been checked for the time being.<sup>25</sup>

Seven years later, in an intervention very similar to that in Lebanon, US forces entered the Dominican Republic after rebel groups that included communist elements had overthrown a pro-American government in Santo Domingo. Again, as in Lebanon, American soldiers and marines anticipated combat operations; again, they spent most of their time engaged in such unorthodox activities as separating the warring parties, providing security and humanitarian assistance in the capital city, enforcing cease-fire agreements, gathering intelligence on rebel forces, engaging in PSYOPs and crowd control, serving as the “muscle” behind diplomatic efforts, playing their part in the Inter-American Peace Force created after their arrival, and, once a provisional government was formed, serving as its military arm until the regular Dominican military could be reconstituted. Well into the intervention, US combat troops continued to perform many of these functions, even after large numbers of military police (MP), civil affairs (CA) and PSYOP units, civic action personnel, and other military specialists in political, economic, and humanitarian issues had deployed into the area of operations. The Pentagon called the intervention a stability operation, and when the United States ended its intervention the following year, stability had been achieved.<sup>26</sup>

The Dominican crisis occurred just six years after Fidel Castro had installed a communist government in Cuba, and four years after the Soviet Union had called on Third World countries and colonies to engage in Wars of National Liberation against the United States and other Western imperialist powers. In the Dominican Republic the United States had intervened with conventional force to counter this threat, but throughout the 1960s, Washington was also preoccupied with communist-led insurgencies in the underdeveloped countries of Latin America and Asia. As early as 1961, President John F. Kennedy signaled the urgency with which he regarded this threat when he instructed the Army to focus less on the prospect of conventional war and more on counterinsurgency. The Army pledged compliance, but never truly embraced the reorientation. The Army’s Special Forces (SF), however, did shift their mission from fomenting insurgencies behind Soviet lines in the event of World War III to conducting irregular warfare in underdeveloped countries. SF mobile training teams, together with Army advisory groups, moved throughout Latin America, training local forces, engaging in some degree of nation building, and advising on counterinsurgency programs and tactics. The stability operations performed by these small units numbered in the hundreds.<sup>27</sup> Similar efforts were geared toward the Far East, particularly Southeast Asia, and, more specifically, Vietnam.

Since the late 1950s, the communist-led insurgency in South Vietnam

had been growing, despite the efforts of US military advisers to help Saigon's armed forces respond to the threat. When North Vietnamese regulars joined the fight, the United States reacted in 1965 by sending in American combat units. By the time the last of these forces had withdrawn in early 1973, Vietnam had become the longest war in US history, and the divisions it caused within American society still influence military decisions today. In many respects, Vietnam was a limited conventional war against regular forces; in other respects, it was a guerrilla war; and in still other respects, it was an exercise in pacification, stability operations, and nation building.

American troops were most effective when fighting conventionally. Counterinsurgency activities fared less well, although a number of innovative programs, such as the Marines' Combined Action Platoons (where marines and local Vietnamese defense forces lived together in threatened villages and hamlets), enjoyed some success. In general, pacification and stability operations did not yield significant results until the establishment of the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS), an organization under the US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) that integrated American military personnel and civilian officials in a program that ranged "from regional security and paramilitary forces to propaganda to agricultural development." CORDS received high praise for what it managed to accomplish in the way of pacifying much of the countryside, but even its supporters argued that it came too late in the war to really turn the tide. Antiwar demonstrations in the United States, the failure of the Saigon government to make far-reaching reforms that might have won broad support in the south, and the wide cultural gap that separated the Americans and Vietnamese are just three of the many reasons the United States failed in Vietnam.<sup>28</sup>

One consequence of that failure was the so-called "Vietnam Syndrome," the belief held by civilian policy makers and high-ranking military officers that, short of a direct and lethal threat to US security, the American people would not support the deployment of US forces in combat or stability operations that did not have clear objectives and a short-term "exit strategy". The syndrome certainly limited (and, to some extent, still limits) US military commitments abroad, although in the decade or so after Vietnam, the projection of America's armed power by no means came to a halt. Throughout the 1980s, for example, US Special Operations Forces (SOF) continued to conduct a variety of stability and training operations in the Caribbean region, especially in Central America, where, for a decade after 1979, a communist government ruled in Nicaragua, and neighboring El Salvador was in the throes of a communist-led insurgency. There

were times when even conventional forces were deployed to the region. In October 1983, for example, President Ronald Reagan ordered marines, an Army airborne division, SOF, and other US armed forces to invade the tiny island country of Grenada in order to overthrow a communist regime, rescue American medical students on the island, restore stability, and establish a pro-US government. Five years later, Reagan deployed elements of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) to Honduras (Operation GOLDEN PHEASANT) to thwart what was perceived as a Nicaraguan threat from across the border. In the chronically unstable Middle East, US marines revisited Lebanon from 1982 to 1984 in an effort to stabilize that country after civil war erupted again in the mid-1970s. Originally cast as peace keepers, by mid-1983 the marines were engaged in what was at times heavy combat, culminating in the October terrorist bombing that killed 241 of their number. The critical reaction to this event and the in-depth analysis that followed attested to the complexity of most stability operations and the continuing influence of the Vietnam experience over military policy.<sup>29</sup>

In perhaps the last major US military intervention of the Cold War (or, some might argue, the first of the post-Cold War period), American forces invaded Panama in December 1989 (Operation JUST CAUSE) to topple the dictatorial regime of Manuel Noriega and to restore stability and democracy to the country. Stability and nation-building operations began simultaneously with combat operations, as US officials helped swear in a new Panamanian government minutes before the invasion, and American troops in the midst of combat operations had to contend with refugees and looters. (The refugee problem was still a scandal a year after the intervention, while the several days of unrestricted looting in Panama's two largest cities inflicted serious damage on the country's economy.) As in previous operations, conventional troops were required to perform a variety of stability tasks for which they were ill-prepared. Compounding the problem, the pre-invasion failure to integrate the conventional war plan and the civil-military operation plan (CMO OPLAN) precluded a smooth transition from an emphasis on combat operations to stability and nation-building operations. So, too, did the US command's inability to deploy significant numbers of CA personnel and reservists into the theater in a timely manner. The stability and nation-building effort in Panama was code-named Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY. Following the recommendation of the commander of the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in Florida, a Military Support Group (MSG) was established under Joint Task Force (JTF) Panama to help the

country's new government function effectively, provide for the training of a new Panamanian police and paramilitary force, and assist in reviving the country's financial and economic fortunes. Attached to the MSG were MP, PSYOP, CA, and SOF assets. A year after its formation, the MSG disbanded, its mission accomplished.<sup>30</sup>

In the decade beginning in 1990, it became conventional wisdom in the Army that the operational tempo of military operations other than war had been very low during the Cold War compared to what it would become in the years immediately following the end of that global contest. In reality, the United States had employed its armed forces several hundred times between 1945 and 1990 in operations designed to bring some degree of stability to various countries and regions.

### **The Post-Cold War Decade, 1990-2000**

As the Cold War ended with a whimper, not a bang, many predicted it would be superseded by a New World Order that would be more stable than any system the international community had seen in almost a century. Others predicted that the world, in fact, would become a more dangerous and unstable place, as ethnic, religious, tribal, and other local and regional conflicts, repressed, ignored, or co-opted by the superpowers' regional ambitions during the Cold War, would become more prominent and increasingly disruptive. The decade of the 1990s seemed to validate the second prognostication, as local conflicts emerged or reemerged on virtually every continent and as the US military found itself gainfully employed and deployed throughout the world. The motives for US intervention varied from case to case: national interest in the Persian Gulf, humanitarian issues in war-torn Somalia, political fears triggered by Haitian "boat people," and concerns over regional war in the Balkans. In Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, the United States fought another limited, conventional war, this time to protect Saudi Arabian oil fields and to prevent further Iraqi destabilization of the Gulf area. The US-led multinational coalition quickly defeated Saddam Hussein's army, but Washington, having no intention of occupying Iraq, had no plans for major postconflict stability operations. When Iraq's Shia and Kurdish populations rose up against Saddam at the end of the conflict, they were brutally suppressed, causing the United States to belatedly launch Operation PROVIDE COMFORT for the purpose of supplying them humanitarian aid. This major undertaking captured headlines at the time, but was largely forgotten in subsequent years, even within military circles.<sup>31</sup>

More memorable is the US experience in Somalia from 1992 to 1994. The memories, however, are largely negative: *Black Hawk Down*, "mission

creep,” the perceived “misuse” of the military in a humanitarian crisis in which America’s national interests were not at stake. Forgotten is the success US and coalition forces enjoyed in the first phase of their involvement, Operation RESTORE HOPE. Thanks to the overwhelming force deployed under a combined task force (CTF) commanded by Marine Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, the clan warfare responsible for spreading chaos and famine in southern Somalia was kept under control, starving people received food and medical attention, a program of weapons control was imposed on various warring factions, an apolitical police force was reactivated, and political processes were initiated to end the country’s internal strife. When the UN took over from the US-led coalition and attempted nation-building activities in all of Somalia, UN officials on the scene lacked the overwhelming force that Johnston had commanded, and the situation quickly deteriorated to the point where a tactical setback involving American SOF caused a major reversal of US policy in the country.<sup>32</sup>

The resulting “Vietmalia” Syndrome, to use diplomat Richard Holbrooke’s terminology, delayed US intervention in the ongoing crisis in the Balkans, but did not prevent President William J. Clinton from sending US troops into Haiti, largely to end the violence and instability that had motivated thousands of impoverished Haitians to flee by boat the brutal dictatorial military regime under which they had suffered. Even before the first American troops landed, the Clinton administration’s goal of “regime change” had been accomplished, leaving the invasion force to provide security and prepare the way for national elections that, it was hoped, would set the country on a path of sustained stability. The US command in Haiti planned and secured the elections, and soon after the new president was inaugurated, American forces withdrew. However, reminiscent of past American experiences in Cuba, Haiti (1915-1934) the Dominican Republic (1916-1924), and Nicaragua, the order and stability established by US forces in Haiti in the mid-1990s did not long survive their departure.<sup>33</sup> A decade after the 1994 American intervention, the marines would return as part of a multinational peacekeeping force following another outbreak of major violence in 2004.

US ground troops entering Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of a NATO-led force in December 1995 fared better, although the long-term ramifications of their efforts to stabilize the Balkan area and prevent a regional war have yet to play out.<sup>34</sup> Once international attention shifted to Kosovo, the multinational military coalition employed armed force to bring the offending parties into line, and then returned to the implementation of the various accords designed to stabilize the situation. That stabilization effort continues as of this writing, although the role played by American forces

has been cut back dramatically in light of US commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq stemming from the Global War on Terrorism.

### **Patterns and Recurring Themes**

Although selective, the preceding overview of stability operations throughout American history strongly suggests that, on the basis of frequency and numbers alone, the US military should not regard the occurrence of such operations as an aberration, but as an integral part of its general and ongoing missions. A more thorough and comparative analysis of each of the 28 case studies listed in appendix A would also yield a number of patterns and recurring themes that are relevant to the conduct of stability operations today. The list that follows here is far from exhaustive, but does suggest some general issues and problem areas. These are divided into three categories: traditional military assumptions and their impact on preparations for stability operations; the conduct of stability operations; and the environment in which these operations take place. Where appropriate, a historical example is included to illustrate a pattern or recurring theme.

#### **Traditional Military Assumptions Concerning Stability Operations and the Preconflict Ramifications**

*Traditionally, the US military has not regarded stability operations as a “core” mission with a priority approaching that accorded to combat operations.* The American military has traditionally focused on conventional warfighting as its most important mission, and while few officers have challenged the Clausewitzian axiom that wars are the “continuation of policy by other means,” a pervasive belief maintains that, once an enemy’s conventional forces have been defeated, the responsibility of the military for helping the policy makers achieve the broader objectives for which the hostilities were conducted has been largely fulfilled. While in many cases there may be a requirement for some specialized troops to participate in follow-on stability operations designed to solidify the war’s accomplishments, the military traditionally has regarded most of those tasks as “someone else’s job.” In other words, it is the military’s responsibility to win the war, not to win the peace.

Carried to its extreme, this line of thinking contributes to a situation in which, as Professor Frederick Kagan has noted, the United States “has developed and implemented a method of warfare that can produce stunning military victories but does not necessarily accomplish the political goals for which the war was fought.”<sup>35</sup> As America’s experience for over 200 years would suggest, the US military has a critical mission that goes beyond warfighting and necessitates a professional mind set that perceives war

and peace to be interrelated, not compartmentalized phenomena. In the words of one analyst, “The essential point is this: Combat operations and governance operations are both integral to war and occur in tandem.”<sup>36</sup>

In a variation on the theme of “it’s not my job,” many US officers have acknowledged that stability operations are a valid military mission, but only for certain personnel and units, such as CA and information operations (IO) specialists, MPs, engineers, medics, lawyers, and SOF. According to this view, stability operations have not been—and should not be—a core mission for conventional combat and combat support units. Not only are these conventional units ill-prepared and poorly trained to engage in nontraditional missions, but they risk losing their fighting edge when they do. To make stability operations a core mission for combat troops would only exacerbate the degradation of their warfighting skills and warrior ethos. In short, warriors should not be forced to double as cops, social workers, civil administrators, economists, diplomats, and politicians, either on the training field or in real-life situations.

These arguments against making stability operations a core mission for the military as a whole betray more wishful thinking than an understanding of the military’s historical experience. Given that experience, there is every reason to believe that US armed forces will continue to face situations in which the requirements of war and peace cannot be compartmentalized, in which conflicts other than conventional war will require the deployment of combat units to impose security and stability, and in which the country’s decision makers will continue to direct the military to conduct those missions that have to be done, not necessarily those with which the military is most comfortable. Yet, despite this prognosis, any general officer or political leader seeking to add stability operations as a core military mission will have to overcome and, in the process, transform a deep-seated traditional mind set as to the proper role of the country’s armed forces, especially the Army.

As of this writing, the experiences of most US combat units in Iraq are helping to change the traditional mind set, as are initiatives directed by the Department of Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Army. But there is always the possibility that the occupation of Iraq, however it turns out, will be seen by traditionalists as just another aberration; it could even end up reinforcing the traditionalist view, just as Vietnam did, that the United States should avoid wide-ranging commitments to stability operations at all costs.

*Military planning for major combat operations (MCO) and stability*

*operations has generally been compartmentalized, not integrated.* Just as the traditionalist military viewpoint regards the requirements of war and peace to be related but separate and compartmentalized phenomena, it also perceives MCO and stability operations not only as separate and distinct kinds of activities, but activities that occur in sequential, not overlapping, phases. More precisely, stability operations are seen as beginning once major combat operations have ceased or are near completion. This perception, however ahistorical it might be, has often resulted in segregated preconflict planning for the two categories of operations (on those occasions when there was any military planning at all for the stability operations “phase”). When compartmentalization of MCO and stability operations planning has occurred, as a rule, there has been little coordination between the two groups of planners, with stability missions and tasks generally ignored or given only lip service by the MCO planners. On the rare occasions when coordination—not integration—between the two groups *has* occurred, the needs of MCO planners have invariably received a higher priority, since winning the war has seemed a logical precondition for initiating effective stability operations. Moreover, the desire to keep friendly, and sometimes enemy, casualties to a minimum during hostilities has favored the priorities of the MCO planners over any competing priorities set by the “postconflict” planners. That losing the peace could render winning the war (however low the cost) irrelevant has tended not to be a consideration in preconflict MCO planning for reasons that are by no means superfluous.

The fact that, in reality, MCO and stability operations are often not sequential or phased but either overlap at various points or, in many instances, are conducted simultaneously throughout the course of a conflict confounds traditional thinking about the temporal relationship between the two categories. For example, when MCO planners insist that “shooters” receive top deployment priorities and first call on scarce resources, the demand seems logical if the US military is to win the war as quickly and efficiently as possible. Such priorities, however, have often meant that the personnel needed immediately and throughout a military campaign for stability operations have not been present in sufficient numbers, nor with sufficient resources, to perform their tasks. These tasks, consequently, have gone wanting or have been performed by combat arms units that have not anticipated such duties or been trained in the necessary skills.

Planning for US combat and stability operations in Panama in the late 1980s illustrates these points. The initial operations order (OPORD) produced by the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in March 1988 incorporated combat and stability operations as phases that could be conducted

separately in any sequence, or simultaneously. At the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that OPORD was broken down into three separate orders: one for defensive operations, one for offensive combat operations, and one for CMO. Procedurally, this meant that combat operations and CMO were relegated to two separate plans—Blue Spoon for the former, Krystal Ball for the latter—and increasingly treated as distinct and largely sequential activities. At the operational level, the XVIII Airborne Corps ultimately became responsible for planning Blue Spoon, while SOUTHCOM's plans and policy staff (J5), assisted by reservist CA teams rotating in and out of Panama, worked on the supporting CMO Task Force OPORD for Krystal Ball. Two critical points should be emphasized here. First, although the Blue Spoon order listed stability operations as a mission for US forces, Corps planners paid little attention to that aspect of the plan, beyond establishing ROE aimed at minimizing damage to the country's military forces, civilian population, and economic infrastructure. Second, at no point was there substantial coordination between the Corps and the SOUTHCOM J5, much less any thought given to integrating Krystal Ball into Blue Spoon. As a result, stability and security issues that arose during combat (for example, looting, humanitarian needs, and refugees) either received insufficient attention from the few MP units and CMO personnel on the scene, or were dealt with by combat units. Once hostilities subsided, the shift in emphasis to stability operations went through a turbulent transition, in which combat units continued to perform a variety of security and stability tasks, while volunteer reservists with the skills necessary for stability operations and nation building belatedly trickled into the country.<sup>37</sup>

As demonstrated in Panama, the conduct of simultaneous major combat operations and stability operations, or the transition in emphasis during the course of a campaign from the former to the latter, can prove a disruptive experience. Historically, the failure to integrate the two types of undertakings is one reason for this disruption. Reflecting on this problem as it manifested itself in Iraq, one US general officer recently declared that there is a need to get the plan for Phase IV “postwar” operations “out of the annex and build it into the actual OPLAN. You should have a single plan to get you to the NSS [National Security Strategy], not just the warfight.”<sup>38</sup> This observation seems to reflect common sense, but so does the conflicting consideration that planners should focus on winning a conflict as expeditiously and with as few casualties as possible.

### **Operations Security (OPSEC)**

In a related issue, operations security is a key component of the planning process for MCO. Because of concerns about OPSEC violations, the

process has often excluded personnel, both military and civilian, involved in planning stability operations.<sup>39</sup> This has generally ensured that the support needed for stability operations from military and civilian sources has lagged far behind what has been required at critical phases of an operation. Procedural and organizational remedies that emphasize the need, *in the preconflict phase*, for military and civilian organizations to coordinate their planning efforts for stability operations and to synchronize these efforts with those of the MCO planners, need to address how to handle the obstructive but essential issues of OPSEC. Even though history and America's current experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq make an urgent case for integrated, interagency planning in the preconflict period, the traditional reluctance of MCO planners to divulge the details of a campaign plan in a forum given to bureaucratic contention and potential security lapses will likely remain a serious obstacle to a truly integrated process.

## **Intelligence**

When the planning process for MCO and stability operations is separated and compartmentalized, the two groups of planners are isolated from each other. Under these conditions, each group will gather only the information relevant to its assigned missions. This myopic approach can have a significantly negative effect when combat troops become responsible for conducting stability operations and the intelligence relevant to those operations is not available to them. Knowing the conventional enemy's order of battle, intentions, tactics, location, and capabilities does not prepare combat units for dealing with looting, refugees, criminals, paramilitary groups, public health and sanitation problems, humanitarian assistance, and other tasks common to stability operations.

An illustrative case would be the US intervention in Lebanon in 1958. The American soldiers and marines going ashore had very good intelligence on the Lebanese armed forces and, to some degree, the Syrian military. The real threat, however, turned out to be from rebel groups and militias representing various sects, religions, clans, and family leaders in the highly complex and contentious environment of Lebanese confessional politics. The US military intelligence (MI) community possessed little or no pertinent information concerning the leadership, motivation, intentions, and capabilities of these groups, and this meant that the troops deploying to Lebanon were also in the dark. As a quick fix, the American embassy and CIA station chief in Beirut readily opened their files to MI officers, but had the situation turned violent early in the intervention, the US force, by its own admission, would not have had the

information it needed to engage in effective politico-military operations against the numerous and unconventional rebel groups.<sup>40</sup>

Replacing the traditional/conventional intelligence preparation of the battlefield with a more unified approach that incorporates noncombat and unconventional data is likely to meet resistance when planning for MCO. Often, time constraints do not allow collection of the vast array of information available. More to the point, the traditional/conventional elements of intelligence will likely continue to receive planning priorities on the assumption that conventional combat poses the greatest risk (short of nuclear, chemical, or biological warfare, of course) to US forces.

### **Execution of Stability Operations**

*US forces conducting stability operations will perform many and diverse tasks.* Stability operations have generally been highly complex undertakings, involving a myriad of tasks performed within several diverse but interrelated fields—political, economic, financial, social, humanitarian—not associated in the traditional mind set with orthodox military operations, functions, or duties. Ideally, these numerous and complex tasks would be performed by those who have the skills and expertise to do so. This, however, has seldom been the case. Large numbers of civilians and civilian organizations with the needed skills and expertise often do not arrive in a theater to conduct stability operations until friendly combat forces have established some measure of security. Even military personnel with similar skills and expertise often do not make a timely appearance, generally because they were not considered a high priority for deployment or, in the case of the reservists, because they were not readily available for rapid deployment. In other instances, the military has simply lacked enough people with the required skills and expertise. As a result of not having the experts in stability operations present when their skills are first needed, combat troops who had been engaged in MCO, or who might have been present in anticipation of MCO, have found themselves performing a myriad of security and stability tasks that, more often than not, they had not anticipated and for which they lacked the requisite proficiency. Complicating the situation was the view often taken by many combat soldiers and marines that it was beneath the dignity of a true warrior to be a cop, to perform social and humanitarian work, to conduct political negotiations, or to engage in certain “demeaning” activities, such as garbage collection.

Several historical cases, not to mention the more recent experience of American combat units in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), illustrate this phenomenon. In the US intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965,

for example, paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division together with a contingent of marines engaged in limited combat during the first two days of the operation. At the same time and for days, weeks, and months thereafter, these combat troops found themselves handing out food, guarding relief distribution points, providing security for US medical and dental units treating the local population, screening pedestrian and vehicular traffic in the American-held sections of Santo Domingo, guarding rebel prisoners (not wanting to assume the role of policemen, US commanders turned the first group of prisoners over to Loyalist forces, who promptly executed them), cleaning up garbage and debris, and performing numerous other tasks that they had not anticipated. As one paratrooper protested, “Clean up the streets, hell—we came here to fight.”<sup>41</sup> After action reports from other US contingency operations are replete with similar sentiments.

*Stability operations often involve military officers in a variety of “political and diplomatic” roles.* Commanders and staff officers who have been engaged in stability operations often have found themselves working with coalition forces, directing a variety of “nonmilitary” (political, economic, social, humanitarian) projects, or even running or helping to administer villages, towns, and cities. All of these activities have generally required political and diplomatic skills that an officer might have acquired through experience or other means, but probably not as a result of formal military education and training. In fact, the tactless “take charge” mentality that has been a hallmark of military training might prove effective on a traditional battlefield but has often proved counterproductive when a US officer has had to interact with foreign officers, humanitarian aid officials, American and foreign diplomats, local authorities, or the indigenous population. Such interactions require negotiating skills, cultural awareness, a sense of historical context, empathy for the position of other participants, patience, a grasp of nuance, a willingness to compromise, and a basic understanding of how various political, economic, and social initiatives affect the military’s role in stability operations. While not a guarantee of success in “political” situations, these attributes are likely to produce better results than more abrasive, insensitive, or confrontational methods.

A historical accounting of the hundreds of US general officers who have acted in political and diplomatic roles during stability operations would include the activities of George Crook in the American West, Wood in Cuba, Pershing in the Philippines, Bruce Palmer in the Dominican Republic, Fred Woerner in Panama, Johnston, Anthony Zinni, and Thomas Montgomery in Somalia, and Wesley Clark in the Balkan crisis. While learning from the experience of these flag officers, it is important to remember that officers

throughout the ranks have had experiences mirroring those of the aforementioned generals. The example of a Ranger platoon leader in Panama illustrates the point. After engaging in combat operations at Río Hato on the first night of Operation JUST CAUSE, the lieutenant was told by a US colonel to administer a small town. As the Ranger later confessed, he did not understand, nor was he prepared by training to carry out, any of the tasks the colonel directed him to perform.<sup>42</sup>

*In politically sensitive stability operations, military actions taken at the operational level and even the tactical level can have a direct impact at the strategic and policy levels.* There are numerous historical examples that prove the validity of the “strategic corporal,” with the one most likely to come to mind being the 1993 fire fight in Mogadishu, “Black Hawk Down,” in which a tactical battle involving SOF in support of a UN-led stability operation in Somalia caused a reversal of American policy at the highest levels.<sup>43</sup> In other cases, the action or decision of just a single individual has often had positive or negative ramifications that seem, on the surface, out of all proportion to the act itself. In most cases, any negative consequences of such actions have not been irreversible, but they have at times created major setbacks that jeopardized the military and political missions.

*Combat operations of a limited or irregular nature may be necessary at some point after stability operations are well under way.* Throughout the US military’s history, there have been several instances in which significant combat occurs during the course of a stability operation. In some cases, such as Somalia (1992-1994) and the second intervention in Lebanon (1982-1984), the combat began well after what had started as a *relatively* peaceful US or coalition intervention. In other cases, such as post-Civil War Reconstruction (1865-1877), the Philippines (1899-1902), the Dominican Republic (1916-1924), Nicaragua during the Sandino Affair (1927-1933), and Iraq (2003-present), conventional combat operations resulting in a US/coalition victory over opposing forces were followed by small-scale conventional operations or guerrilla warfare that, to some degree, disrupted the ongoing stability operations. In these situations, the military had to provide security for all parties engaged in the stability operations while seeking out and neutralizing opposition forces that continued to put up armed resistance. The record of American arms in these situations has been mixed, with some short-term and even long-term successes (the Indian wars, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic in 1916 and again in 1965, and Nicaragua, 1927-1933), and some failures (Lebanon, 1982-1984, and Somalia).

*IO and stability operations.* IO have been an essential part of most stability operations. In many cases, however, IO campaigns have proved only

marginally effective. Reasons vary from case to case and include a lack of time to prepare an effective IO campaign, a need to improvise coordination with other government agencies involved in IO, a dearth of linguists fluent in the indigenous language, disagreements over the focus of an IO campaign, a lack of cultural awareness, and operators who were better trained in IO technical procedures than they were in how to produce a persuasive message.

In the Dominican Republic in 1965, for example, the products disseminated by psychological warfare units tended to explain the US intervention in ethnocentric terms that, by the Army's own surveys, failed to create within the Dominican public a positive view of the US intervention and the benefits it sought to bestow upon the chaotic country. In fact, some IO products had the unintended effect of offending the target audience. As the US commander stated later, "We didn't really know how . . . to communicate with people in that way, because we're just not used to the idea of using [propaganda] as a weapon." Three decades later, in both Haiti and Bosnia, IO-generated leaflets targeting the local population were often printed in the wrong language or dialect. Matters have not been helped when forces opposing US military efforts—especially forces indigenous to a country or region in which those efforts are being made—have conducted their own IO in an effective way. In the Dominican Republic, once again, a military decision that inadvertently left a rebel-controlled radio station outside the zone occupied by American troops proved a propaganda disaster for the first month of the operation, causing the US commander on the scene to label the decision "an almost fatal mistake." Rebel control of the radio was finally ended through military action.<sup>44</sup>

## **The Stability Operations Environment**

The diverse activities that the US military has been called upon to perform in stability operations have generally taken place within an environment that differs in degree or in kind from that in which strictly conventional combat operations typically take place. The failure to anticipate and understand this environment has complicated stability operations in the past and will likely do so in the future.

*Political considerations and activities permeate stability operations at the operational and tactical levels.* In the United States, tradition, law, and principle dictate that the military serve in a subordinate role to a democratically elected civilian government. It is also taken as axiomatic that military objectives and strategy serve larger political goals. Military leaders often play a significant role in the policy debates that determine those larger goals; then, once the political authority has decided on

a course of action, they support that decision. They also expect that the political decision makers will provide them with clear guidance to help shape the military strategy necessary to achieve the political ends. Below the strategic level, however, traditional theory and practice hold that the planning and conduct of operations, as well as the determination of the tactics employed, are military matters best left to the oversight of competent officers imbued with professional expertise and unencumbered by political influences. In stability operations, however, reality often upsets the expectations born of this traditional politico-military relationship.

The reality of bureaucratic infighting, the confusion or uncertainty imparted by a dynamic and often ambiguous situation, and a host of other complications may result in political guidance to the military that lacks specificity and clarity. When the United States intervened in Cuba in 1898 and defeated the Spanish forces there, President William McKinley simply told the American people that US military rule on the island would continue “until complete tranquility and a stable government” had been achieved.<sup>45</sup> The president’s guidance to his top military commander on the scene was no more specific than this, largely because the president himself did not know what policy to follow. American troops landing in Lebanon in 1958 knew they were supposed to prevent a takeover of the country by unfriendly forces, but the Eisenhower administration had provided them no specific guidance on how they were to accomplish that. As the top Army general told a group of deploying troops, “At this time I can not tell exactly what our future mission may be.”<sup>46</sup> In 1982 President Reagan’s secretary of state argued for sending US marines into Lebanon to help stabilize a chaotic situation; the secretary of defense opposed the deployment. The consequent in-fighting resulted in contradictory information and guidance about the deployment and its duration emanating from the highest levels in Washington.<sup>47</sup> The lack of clear political guidance to the military is by no means inevitable in stability operations, but it has occurred often enough that US officers should be prepared to determine how best to act absent clear guidance.

The lack of clear political guidance is not the only influence politics will have on stability operations. Given the political sensitivity of many stability operations, political considerations will often determine or influence military activities at the operational and tactical levels. Recounting his experience in the 1965 Dominican intervention, General Palmer, the commander of US troops there, acknowledged that in a situation “*more political than military*, [it] is inevitable that Washington is going to take direct control.”<sup>48</sup> The political considerations reflected by this control will

often manifest themselves to the military as operational and tactical constraints, which can take a variety of forms. In the Dominican Republic, for example, invading US paratroopers flying to their objective were instructed in flight not to air-drop, as planned, but to air-land. The reason given was that hundreds of parachutes opening over the city of Santo Domingo might appear too “warlike,” a message President Lyndon Johnson did not want to send. In Lebanon in 1982 the US special envoy on the scene denied the US commander permission to occupy the high ground in front of Beirut International Airport for fear that various parties to the conflict would perceive that the marines were guarding the Israeli main supply route that ran through the mountains. Such a misperception could have discredited the appearance of US impartiality that was deemed essential to the success of the marines’ mission.<sup>49</sup>

Other examples of political considerations determining operational and tactical activities abound. But the politically determined constraints US troops in stability operations feel most directly generally come in the form of ROE. ROE dictate circumstances and limitations under which US forces will employ deadly force against an opponent. ROE also provide guidance for how civilians and their property will be treated. In some cases, however, political considerations have compelled military commanders to issue ROE that come close to denying the inherent right of US troops to defend themselves, as was the case in the Dominican Republic (1965-1966) and, some would argue, in the Panama crisis prior to Operation JUST CAUSE. For soldiers and marines trained as warriors, highly restrictive ROE can create uncertainty about when the use of deadly force is permissible, and this uncertainty can have a negative impact on morale. This is especially true in cases like Operation JUST CAUSE, where ROE suited to limited warfare changed overnight to restrictive rules more appropriate to stability operations. Also in Panama, the ROE written strictly for stability operations changed frequently and varied from one location to another within the same area of operations, adding to the troops’ confusion, uncertainty, and, at times, resentment.<sup>50</sup> Too often, the response of military officers to restrictive ROE has been to denounce the intrusion of political considerations into the domain of the military and vow to fight such incursions in future operations. A more realistic approach would be for officers to accept such constraints as a given and determine how best to accomplish the mission in light of them.

*In stability operations, US and coalition forces will interact regularly with local leaders and citizens, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), various diplomats and other dignitaries.* Not only have US forces in the past lacked the political skills discussed earlier needed to facilitate interaction

with a variety of nonmilitary groups, but the troops have regularly faced a “cultural gap” in dealing with these groups, a gap that has sometimes been bridged, but too often has not.

Most US stability operations have occurred in countries whose cultures differ greatly from that of the United States. In America’s earliest experiences overseas (Cuba, the Philippines, Mexico, the Banana Wars), accepted racial theories in the West ensured that US troops would assume the “white man’s burden” and attempt to transform these “primitive and barbaric” cultures by forcing them into an American mold. This early method of remaking countries in America’s image enjoyed little success, however, except perhaps in the Philippines. During the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, such heavy-handed cultural imperialism, besides being anachronistic, would have been counterproductive to US goals and national security. While not disavowing the superiority and appeal of democracy and free market economics, the United States relied more on persuasion than coercion as its principal method for spreading American principles and institutions. Since the US military was often involved in this process, service members regularly found themselves in need of some degree of cultural awareness. At minimum, this required a basic familiarity with a foreign country’s language, manners, and behavioral norms; beyond that, it was helpful to acquire a deeper understanding about a country’s beliefs and values, its socioeconomic and political structure, and the way in which indigenous groups and individuals interacted.

Relatively speaking, few American military personnel in the past could be said to have demonstrated much cultural awareness, much less an interest in acquiring it, and those who did make the effort were often suspected of “going native.” Still, officers who have tried to understand—but by no means embrace—the culture of the country in which they were conducting stability operations have often found their efforts rewarded. The examples of Pershing in the Philippines and Zinni in Somalia come to mind. Cultural awareness is important up and down the military’s chain of command—from flag officers to the lowest ranking troops on the front line. It is most often the front-line soldiers and marines engaged in small-unit activities who have the most contact with the local population. The more these troops know about the local culture, the greater the chance that they will develop relationships that will prove useful to mission accomplishment.

In stability operations not only will US forces operate within an indigenous culture, but often foreign troops are placed under US com-

mand, complicating mission requirements in other areas such as logistics, communication, and interoperability. In some cases, foreign officers serving in a multinational coalition will be required to consult and report to their own national political authorities before committing to an action directed by the US commander (the UN operation in Somalia from 1993 to 1995 offers a good example of this). Foreign countries may also have joined a coalition to pursue their own political agenda, as was illustrated by the behavior of the initial Russian contingents in Bosnia. In general, past stability operations have benefited from having a coalition force present, despite the problems inherent in any multinational military undertaking.

During stability operations, it is common for US troops to also interact with a variety of nongovernment and humanitarian organizations. Such, for example, was the case in Cuba in 1898, when the American V Corps commander landed his force and was immediately confronted by requests for assistance from Red Cross representatives already there. In many stability operations, US troops who interacted with NGOs experienced a “cultural gap.” Many NGOs cannot work with military organizations by charter, others prefer not to; some harbor an antimilitary bias, and others often operate in areas beyond the military’s control. Different agendas and markedly different ways of doing business also contribute to friction between the US military and NGOs. This discord, however, does not remove the need for the military to interact with the civilians for the sake of accomplishing the mission. Generally, the necessary interaction and coordination has been arranged on an ad hoc basis, but following the successful model of the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) in Somalia, an organizational arrangement designed to minimize any military-NGO friction has been employed in subsequent stability operations.<sup>51</sup>

Finally, the media has also historically played a role in stability operations. During the 1965 Dominican intervention and the Vietnam War, relations between the US military and American news media deteriorated markedly, and the distrust and suspicion generated in those days still exists to one degree or another. Past experience demonstrates that it is generally better to have the media in support of stability operations than critical of them. The desired military-media relationship can best be achieved through personal and organizational interactions that, while not devoid of friction, should not go out of their way to generate it. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf’s masterful handling of the media during Operation DESERT STORM serves as an example of a military commander

fostering a near-harmonious relationship with the media. That that relationship remained harmonious, however, could in part be explained by the short duration and overwhelming success of the war.

*The environment in which stability operations take place is generally dynamic, complex, and often ambiguous.* In highly dynamic, rapidly changing situations, US forces committed to stability operations have often needed to perform unanticipated tasks in order to meet changing requirements and to accomplish their mission. At the time of the US involvement in Somalia, this phenomenon was labeled “mission creep,” an unfortunate term in that the “missions” in past stability operations rarely changed, only the tasks required to accomplish them, and such changes were most often unavoidable. In the Dominican Republic in 1965, US forces intervened to fight communist-led rebels. The heaviest fighting lasted for only two days, after which the combat units entered a year and a half of stability operations in which they served as peace keepers, peacemakers, and peace enforcers. They had anticipated none of these roles, but performing them became essential to accomplish the original mission of establishing a stable, noncommunist, pro-US government in Santo Domingo. In Somalia during Operation RESTORE HOPE, Lieutenant General Johnston undertook a number of unanticipated initiatives that civilian and military critics in the United States denounced as “nation building” and “mission creep.” Johnston, though, justified each of the controversial undertakings—reactivating the Somali police force, politically empowering local elders, sanctioning various civic action projects—as a necessary step toward achieving his original mission. Planners and commanders, in short, need to anticipate “mission creep” as an inevitable part of any complex and dynamic stability operation.<sup>52</sup>

In past stability operations, US forces learned that, for sensitive political reasons, traditional concepts of the “enemy” often did not apply. In extreme cases, such as the Dominican Republic in 1965, troops were told that the people shooting at them on a daily basis were not the enemy and, therefore, could not be neutralized militarily. In this instance, as in others, confusion and resentment within the ranks naturally followed such pronouncements. In counterinsurgency, there has rarely been any doubt that those trying to kill you are the enemy; the problem has been finding them, as they have generally lived among the people, indistinguishable from friendly elements of the population. The frequent inability in stability operations to react to hostile activity or to find an acknowledged enemy has resulted in anger and demoralization among friendly forces and, too often, has been the cause of military action, including atrocities,

against civilians who were suspected of being hostile or of supporting hostile forces. The Indian wars, the Civil War occupations, the Philippine War, Nicaragua, Vietnam, and Iraq today have demonstrated the harsher consequences of the frustrations generated, in part, by not being able to define or identify the enemy.

## **The Historical Record and US Capabilities for Stability Operations**

The list of patterns and recurring themes that emerge from a case study approach to the US military's experience in stability operations over 200 years is lengthy, and only a few of the more significant findings are presented here. Still, through these findings (as well as a careful study of current events), it is possible to reach some conclusions as to what *capabilities* the US armed forces, especially the US Army, require in order to conduct stability operations more effectively. In discussing these capabilities, the P-DOTLMPF (Planning-Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leader Development, Materiel, Personnel, and Facilities) framework will be employed. Facilities, however, will not be considered in this work.

### **Planning**

*Integrated planning.* Since stability operations occur before, during, and after combat operations, the military requires a capability to integrate the planning for both types of operations, and to do so at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. America's military history provides few examples of the armed forces possessing or utilizing this capability; rather, planning for each type of operation has generally been separated and compartmentalized. Where coordination—not integration—has occurred between the combat and “postconflict” planners, requirements for combat operations have tended to override those for stability operations. The capability for integrated planning would recognize and act upon the reality that both kinds of operations are necessary to achieve the goals of national strategy. Since the outbreak of the insurgency in Iraq, the US government, including the Pentagon, has undertaken a number of measures to ensure integrated planning in future stability operations (see below). As of this writing, the future effectiveness of those initiatives remains problematic.

*OPSEC.* In planning combat operations, the need for OPSEC generally means that only key policy makers and essential military personnel will participate in the planning process and possess detailed knowledge of the campaign plan. In order for the integrated planning of combat and stability operations to work, the military requires a capability that will allow it

to retain OPSEC regarding MCO, while including in the planning process all essential military personnel involved in projected stability operations. Ideally, it would help to have a capability for bringing the appropriate civilian groups, both government and nongovernment, into an integrated process.

*The “other” perspective.* The historical record suggests that planners for stability operations would profit from determining, as best they can, not only what resources the military can bring to bear to solve anticipated problems, but how the local population and its leaders will respond to actions the military undertakes to address those problems. To this end, planners must have a capability to access resources that will increase their understanding of situational, demographic, and cultural factors that could affect any contemplated stability operation.

## **Doctrine**

*Integrated doctrine.* US military capabilities for stability operations must be reflected in doctrine. Generally, stability operations do not occur in isolation from other types of operations, including combat, and doctrine should emphasize requirements for the integrated planning and execution of these operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

*Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) and doctrine for stability operations.* To enhance the Army’s capabilities in stability operations, the requirements for such operations need to be incorporated into BOS doctrine, the Army’s warfighting framework. (BOS categories are command and control, combat service support, intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility, countermobility, and survivability.) For example, doctrine for *intelligence* in stability operations needs to delineate the nontraditional priority intelligence requirements likely to arise. Another example would be *fire support*, where the various weapons systems used for that purpose perform certain roles in combat, but different roles in stability operations.<sup>53</sup>

*Stability operations doctrine for combat units.* As America’s military experience readily demonstrates, combat troops are generally required to perform a variety of unorthodox and nonmilitary tasks in stability operations. Doctrine needs to delineate these nontraditional roles so that combat units can better plan and train for them.

## **Organization**

*General purpose vs. special purpose forces.* The American experience in stability operations is so extensive and so diverse that not one organizational model fits either the general phenomenon itself or each of the sev-

eral operational categories that fall under it. Whether stability operations have occurred during combat or required combat units to help achieve success, or whether such operations have taken place in a permissive and benign environment, the organizational approach adopted by the US military, almost without exception, has been to field a range of general purpose forces suited to the requirements of the operation. (An exception would be SF organizations, such as the Special Action Force of the 1960s, designed to conduct stability tasks on a small scale.) In other words, the organization committed to a given stability operation has been the result of putting together the units and personnel needed on an ad hoc basis, and the mix of units and personnel cobbled together for one stability operation has rarely duplicated the organization committed to another.

By employing this flexible approach, the United States has tailored headquarters and subordinate units that best address the operational requirements of a given problem or situation. In those cases where stability operations have been unsuccessful, the cause of the failures cannot be attributed to the task-organization of general purpose forces, but to other causes such as a failure to integrate planning, a lack of resources, the unpreparedness of certain units involved, the dynamics of the situation, and so on. Indeed, in those unsuccessful ventures, there is no reason to believe that the use of special purpose forces would have fared any better than the task-organized general purpose forces. Moreover, where stability operations occur in the midst of hostilities, a deployment of special purpose units in conjunction with general purpose units could create command and control problems and violate the principle of unity of effort, thus further complicating an already complex situation. The idea that significant numbers of special purpose forces can be deployed and employed together with combat troops looks good on paper but ignores the strains that have historically been placed on transportation and other critical resources and assets during war. Therefore, the US military experience in stability operations strongly supports the continued use of general purpose forces, task-organized in a modular fashion and, more important, prepared for the tasks they will be directed to perform.

## **Training**

Throughout its history, the US military has rarely trained combat and combat support elements for the conduct of stability operations. In the case of the Army, a unit whose specific mission and qualifications were deemed pertinent to stability operations received the relevant training. The force as a whole did not. This was particularly true of the combat arms, whose operational responsibilities were seen to end once an enemy had

been vanquished. The historical record suggests, however, that, for the Army to develop greater proficiency at conducting stability operations, it needs to develop or, where present, refine its training capability to achieve the following objectives:

- Prepare leaders and units for the requirements of stability operations.
- Prepare leaders and units for the simultaneous conduct of combat operations and stability operations and the transition from an emphasis on the former to the latter.
- Prepare officers in combat units for the nontraditional and diverse activities they could be called upon to perform in stability operations. The training should include the variety of political constraints and limitations that have been imposed on military personnel in the conduct of past stability operations.
- Prepare officers and units for operating in an environment, often urban, populated with civilians, NGOs, government and private-sector officials, the news media, and other nonmilitary individuals and groups.
- Prepare officers and units for integrated planning and for the BOS-related requirements of stability operations in a hostile environment.
- Prepare officers and units to interact in a culturally unfamiliar environment.

## **Leader Development**

The historical record suggests that the US military needs to develop or refine its capabilities for leader development in such ways as to supplement and enhance the training objectives outlined above and to emphasize the following key points as well.

*Stability operations as a “core” mission.* The American military experience suggests that stability operations are not just “fads,” “aberrations,” or “second-class” operations; rather, such operations can determine whether the United States achieves the objectives outlined in its National Security Strategy. Thus, military leaders should view stability operations, and the requisite skill sets needed to undertake them, as critical core competencies.

*The combat arms are generally an essential part of stability operations.* Too often, stability operations are not conducted in the kind of benign, permissive environment that would preclude the use of combat forces as an integral part of the operation.

*Cultural awareness.* Most stability operations will be conducted in countries that are culturally different from the United States. While US officers cannot become experts on the culture of any given foreign country in which they will operate, they can at least try to acquire a basic familiarity with that country's language, political and economic systems, social structure, belief and value systems, and behavioral norms. In the process of acquiring this knowledge, officers must address not just how US troops should behave in the country, but seek a broader awareness of the institutions and relationships that make that society function. Officers should be exposed early in their careers to the importance of cultural awareness and required, at a minimum, to take language training. Cultural awareness should also be emphasized at each stage of their professional and personal education.<sup>54</sup>

*The complexity of politico-military operations.* Stability operations by their nature are complex politico-military operations. Officers who have been educated and trained to believe that their "job" encompasses strictly *military* matters are likely to be unprepared for the requirements placed upon them by stability operations.

*The interdependency of the military in stability operations.* In a point related to the previous one, military activities in stability operations are generally deeply involved in political, economic, social, and informational activities. Professional military education and professional development programs can help prepare officers for these unorthodox situations.

Above all, leader development needs to reassess the mind set of the traditional military, and whether such a mind set is appropriate in light of both the US military's historical experience and the current operating environment.

## **Materiel**

The US military has not always had the materiel necessary for implementing stability operations readily available. This has been especially true when combat operations and stability operations have been conducted simultaneously, or when the requirements of a given stability operation have not been clearly anticipated. In light of this record, it would seem that the military needs to refine its capability to anticipate and stockpile the materiel likely to be required in a stability operation, so that the resources can be made available in a timely way to the affected units.

## **Personnel**

In past stability operations, the US military has experienced challenges moving the right people for the mission into the theater quickly and

efficiently. One recurring problem has been the shortage or unavailability of area specialists and linguists. The talents of these individuals are needed during the planning process to provide realistic assessments of what approaches will work well in a given country. In the execution of the plan, the same experts are needed to interact with the indigenous leaders and population, serving as translators and facilitators. Further complicating the personnel issue, the majority of the personnel with the skills to support stability operations are in the reserve components, decreasing their ability to become involved on the ground quickly and effectively. From a historical standpoint, the active Army needs to enhance its capability to maintain a large number of personnel qualified to support stability operations and to make them available in a timely way.

### **Summary and Prognosis**

To summarize, a historical assessment of the 28 selected case studies of US stability operations supports the following assumptions concerning the Army's role in future stability operations.

- The US government will continue to conduct stability operations.
- Stability operations will be conducted in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment.
- The US military, especially the Army, will play a critical role in stability operations.
- The US military will bear some significant responsibility for planning in the pre-execution phase of stability operations.
- The US military must be capable of conducting stability operations simultaneously with other military operations.

To anyone who has studied the historical record, none of the above should occasion surprise. The statements find their source in over two centuries of military experience. Yet, throughout most of that past, there has been within the American military establishment a professional, personal, and institutional resistance to these basic observations. There have been exceptions, at least on the surface, such as during the early 1960s when President Kennedy directed the Army to give much greater emphasis to counterinsurgency in its training, doctrine, and professional education. Officially, the Army complied; in reality, the compliance amounted to little more than lip service, with little or no substantive movement away from the service's comfort zone of conventional warfare.<sup>55</sup>

The insurgencies and America's nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq have generated new initiatives to prepare the US government and the military, particularly the Army, for stability operations. On 5

August 2004, for example, the State Department created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) “to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for postconflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.” The S/CRS website contains an elaborate Postconflict Reconstruction Essentials Tasks Matrix that breaks the list into four categories: governance and participation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation. The matrix offers visual proof of the complexity of stability operations, the multitude of tasks involved, and the difficulties inherent in forming an interagency approach to such operations. More to the point, each of the four categories requires the participation of US military forces.<sup>56</sup>

The Army has recognized this fact, as demonstrated by the prominence afforded stability operations (referred to as “stability and reconstruction operations,” or S&RO) in its latest version of FM 1.<sup>57</sup> When published, other field manuals, namely updated editions of FM 3-0, *Operations*, and FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, will address stability operations in more detail. The forthcoming doctrine promises to emphasize the variety of conditions in which stability operations are needed and conducted; the fact that a stability operation may take place in conjunction with offensive and defensive operations and, thus, may involve both “coercive and cooperative” actions; the impact of stability operations on the military, political, economic, and information “dimensions of the operational environment”; the need to understand “regional culture and politics”; and the “use of minimum lethality consistent with rules of engagement.”<sup>58</sup>

With the doctrinal review in progress, the Chief of Staff of the Army created a Stability and Reconstruction Operations Focus Area “mandated to identify and implement initiatives to increase Army capabilities to plan and conduct stability operations in a joint, interagency, and multinational context.” Members of the focus area team were to “identify initiatives for both immediate implementation and for ensuring full-spectrum capabilities of the future force as well as assess S&RO requirements for all force sizing construct elements.” The team completed its work in 2005 and forwarded its recommendations to the Chief of Staff.<sup>59</sup>

On 28 November 2005, DOD issued a directive with the subject heading of “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.” A key paragraph in the document

declared: "Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning."<sup>60</sup>

How the execution of this DOD directive, together with the application of updated Army doctrine, will proceed is, as of this writing, an open question. There are many obstacles that both initiatives will have to overcome. The size of the military institution alone militates against any momentous change aimed at transforming the traditional military mind set of those who do not believe stability operations to be a proper military mission or, in modified form, only a mission for a selected few of their number (many of whom are in the reserve force and thus not readily available). The situations in Afghanistan and Iraq have laid the groundwork for such a transformation. Yet, should the United States leave Iraq before the end of the decade and before the American military becomes involved in another stability operation of similar scope and importance, what seems so obvious today might revert—as did the 20-year experience in Vietnam—to the status of "aberration," with a concomitant reinforcement of the traditional military mind set.<sup>61</sup> Thus, the problem confronting those inside and outside the Pentagon who are calling for change: how best to proceed with an intellectual and institutional transformation that might take a generation to effect. However those leaders address the problem, they would do well to consult and employ to the utmost the historical experience of their own institution.

## Notes

1. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 2001), paragraph 1-1, p.1-3; paragraph 1-4, p.1-3. This citation covers the opening quotation and the doctrinal terms “full spectrum” and “warfighting.”

2. Each of the eleven wars listed had an unconventional element to it. There are a number of analysts who would argue that in Vietnam, the unconventional element was, in fact, predominant. The point is controversial. One of the more forceful proponents of the view that, from 1965 on, the Vietnam War was primarily a conventional conflict between American/South Vietnamese forces and North Vietnamese regulars is the late Harry G. Summers in his *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (New York: Dell, 1984). For the counterargument emphasizing the unconventional aspects of the war, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

3. This quote comes from a portion of the working draft for FM 3-0 that was provided to the author in January 2006. It is imperative to emphasize that, at that time, the draft had not been approved for official release. The quote is used here simply to provide the reader with an up-to-date description of stability operations as conceived by the doctrine writers. Until approved in its existing form or in a revised form, the paragraph cited has no official doctrinal authority.

4. The list is taken from FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 2003).

5. For lists that include what today would be called stability operations, see US Congress, *Congressional Record-Senate* (23 June 1969), 16840-44; Barry M. Blechman, Stephen S. Kaplan, et al, *Force without War* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1978), 547-53; Philip D. Zelikow, “Force without War, 1975-82,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 7, no. 1 (March 1984) : 51-54; Herbert K. Tillema, *Appeal to Force: American Military Intervention in the Era of Containment* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1973), 218-25; Congressional Research Service, “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1995” (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 6 February 1996).

6. James Jay Carafano, “Post-Conflict Operations From Europe to Iraq,” *Heritage Lectures* (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 13 July 2004), 3.

7. The term “small wars” is taken from the title of a book authored by C.E. Callwell, a British officer, in 1896. One reprint of C.E. Callwell’s book is *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996).

8. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 130.

9. On the US military’s involvement in Indian affairs in the 19th century, see Francis Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1969); Robert Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army*

and the Indian, 1848-65 (New York: Macmillan, 1967); Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1890* (New York: Macmillan, 1973); Robert Wooster, *The Military and the United States Indian Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988). A brief overview of the Army's role in non-Indian affairs on the frontier can be found in Robert Wooster, "The Frontier Army and the Occupation of the West, 1865-1900," in *Armed Diplomacy: Two Centuries of American Campaigning* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004).

10. The best book-length account of the Second Seminole War is John K. Mahon, *History of the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842* rev. ed. (Gainesville, FL: University Presses of Florida, 1991).

11. Justin Smith, "American Rule in Mexico," *American Historical Review* 23 (January 1918) : 287-302; Edward S. Wallace, "The United States Army in Mexico City," *Military Affairs* 13 (Fall 1949) : 158-66.

12. On occupation and guerrilla warfare during the Civil War, see Michael Fellman, *Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri During the American Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For a fictional account of the guerrilla war that offers countless insights, see Daniel Woodrell, *Woe to Live On* (also titled *Ride with the Devil*) (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1987).

13. The only book-length survey of the US military's role in Reconstruction is James E. Sefton, *The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1967). For a short overview, see Joseph G. Dawson III, "The US Army in the South: Reconstruction as Nation Building" in *Armed Diplomacy*, 39-63. Sherman's thoughts on Reconstruction can be found in Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 246.

14. On the US occupation of Cuba, see David F. Healy, *The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963); Jack C. Lane, *Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood* (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978); and Allan R. Millett, *The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-1909* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1968).

15. On the Philippine war and US pacification of the northern islands, see John Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krag: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1899-1902* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1975); Brian M. Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000); and Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989). For pacification of the Moros, see Lane, *Armed Progressive*; Donald Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing* (New York: Scribner, 1973); and Charles A. Byler, "Leonard Wood, John J. Pershing, and Pacifying the Moros in the Philippines: Americans in a Muslim Land," in *Turning Victory Into Success*, ed. Brian M. De

Toy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 89-104.

16. On the US military occupation of Veracruz, see John S.D. Eisenhower, *Intervention!: The United States and the Mexican Revolution, 1913-1917* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993); and Robert E. Quirk, *An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1962).

17. On the American intervention in Nicaragua, see Neill Macaulay, *The Sandino Affair* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1967); Richard Millett, *Guardians of the Dynasty: A History of the U.S. Created Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and the Somoza Family* (New York: Orbis Books, 1977).

18. The quote from Max Boot is in *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 181. On US military activities in the Caribbean basin, see Bruce J. Calder, *The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the U.S. Occupation of 1916-1924* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984); Stephen M. Fuller and Graham A. Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, US Marine Corps, 1974); David F. Healy, *Gunboat Diplomacy in the Wilson Era: The U.S. Navy in Haiti, 1915-1916* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976); Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971); Lester D. Langley, *The Banana Wars: An Inner History of American Empire, 1900-1934* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1983).

19. US Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1987). (Reprint of 1940 edition.)

20. Germany country study at <http://countrystudies.us/germany/47.htm>.

21. On the US occupation of Germany after World War II, see John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968); Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1990); James Jay Carafano, "Post-Conflict Operations From Europe to Iraq"; Nadia Schadlow, "War and the Art of Governance," *Parameters* 33 (Autumn 2003) : 85-94; and Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1950). Summaries can be found in the German country study book at <http://countrystudies.us/germany/> and in *American Military History* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1989), 534. The quote on the change in perception of the US-western German interaction is taken from William Stivers, "Victors and Vanquished: Americans as Occupiers in Berlin, 1945-1949," in *Armed Diplomacy*, 157.

In *Waltzing into the Cold War: The Struggle for Occupied Austria* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), James Carafano argues that the US military was unprepared to turn Austria into a democratic country. Regarding Carafano's assessment, a blurb from the book includes the following comment: "The fog of peace, [Carafano] concludes, befuddled U.S. planners." The point is

that, while the outcome of the occupation of both Germany and Austria was favorable to American interests, the process of reaching those favorable results was never smooth or well thought out in terms of the US military's contribution.

22. On the occupation of Japan, see John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999); D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur: Vol. 3, Triumph & Disaster, 1945-1964* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985); and Takemae Eiji, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy* (New York: Continuum, 2002).

23. On the US occupation of southern Korea, see Robert K. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea: KMAC in Peace and War*, ed. Walter G. Hermes (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, US Army, 1962); and Charles M. Dobbs, *The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950* (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1981).

24. For the US effort in Greece and the Philippines, see Larry Cable, *Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War* (New York: New York University Press, 1986). For Greece alone, see Lawrence S. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Howard Jones, *"This New Kind of War": America's Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). For the Philippines, see Lawrence M. Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines—1946-1955* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1986); and Benedict J. Kerkvliet, *The HUK Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977).

25. For US military activities in Lebanon in 1958, see Jack Shulimson, *Marines in Lebanon, 1958* (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, US Marine Corps, 1966); Roger J. Spiller, *"Not War But Like War": The American Intervention in Lebanon*, Leavenworth Paper No. 3 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 1981); and Lawrence A. Yates, "The US Military in Lebanon, 1958: Success Without a Plan" in *Turning Victory Into Success*, 123-33.

26. For US military activities in the Dominican Republic, see Bruce Palmer, Jr., *Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1989); and Yates, *Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966*, Leavenworth Paper No. 15 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 1988).

27. For a summary of US military activities in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s, see Yates, *Power Pack*, 10-13; the relevant sections of Charles M. Simpson III, *Inside the Green Berets* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983); and US Army, 1st Special Forces, 8th Special Forces Group (Airborne), *Special Action Force for Latin America: Historical Report* (each report covers a period of one or two years).

28. The length and complexity of the war in Vietnam defy any attempt to

summarize briefly the variety of stability operations executed by American and Vietnamese forces. The volume of literature on the war is also overwhelming. On the Combined Action Platoons, see Yates, "A Feather in Their CAP? The Marines' Combined Action Program in Vietnam," in William R. Roberts and Jack Sweetman, eds., *New Interpretations in Naval History* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991); on CORDS, see Ronald Spector, *After Tet* (New York: Free Press, 1993); Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); and Douglas Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present* (New York: The Free Press, 1977).

29. On US military activities in Central America in the 1980s, see Andrew Bacevich, et al, *American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador*, Special Report (Washington, DC: Pergamon/Brassey's, 1988); and Benjamin C. Schwarz, *American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1991). On stability operations in Grenada, see John T. Fishel, "The Grenada Intervention of 1983," Report for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [unpublished manuscript]. On the marines in Lebanon, see Benis M. Frank, *U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 1982-1984* (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 1987).

30. On stability operations in Panama, see Yates, "Panama, 1989-1990: The Disconnect Between Combat and Stability Operations," *Military Review* 85, no. 3 (May-June 2005) : 46-52; and Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992).

31. On Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, see Fishel, *Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992).

32. On the US involvement in Somalia, see Robert F. Baumann and Yates, with Versalle F. Washington, "My Clan Against the World": *US and Coalition Forces in Somalia, 1992-1994* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003); United States Forces, Somalia, *After Action Report* [also known as the Montgomery Report] reprint (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2003); and John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1995).

33. On the US involvement in Haiti, see Walter E. Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion": A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1997).

34. On the US involvement in Bosnia, see Baumann, George W. Gawrych, and Kretchik, *Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004); and Larry Wentz, ed., *Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Vienna, VA: CCRP, 1997).

35. Frederick Kagan, "War and Aftermath," *Policy Review Online* <http://www.policyreview.org/aug03/kagan.html>

36. Nadia Schadow, "War and the Art of Governance," 86. See also, Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003).

37. On planning for MCO and CMO in Panama, and the actual interaction of the two kinds of operations, see Fishel, *Fog of Peace*, and Yates, "Panama, 1989-1990."

38. Nonattribution general officer interview, Spring 2005, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

39. Again, Panama provides but one illustrative example of this point, as the two-year development of SOUTHCOM plans for combat operations, CMO, and nation building was restricted largely to military circles.

40. On Lebanon, see Spiller, "*Not War But Like War*"; and Yates, "US Military in Lebanon, 1958."

41. On the various tasks performed by combat units in the Dominican Republic, see Yates, *Power Pack*. The quotation is on p. 133.

42. Comments made by the Ranger officer to the author.

43. See Baumann and Yates, "*My Clan Against the World*," chapters 5 and 6.

44. On information operations in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, see Yates, *Power Pack*, 136-40 (the general officer's quote is on p.139); Bruce Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1989), 46, 151, 159; and Baumann, et al, *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion"*, passim.

45. Lane, *Armed Progressive*, 71.

46. US Army, 24th Infantry Division, *After Action Report for Operation GRANDIOS, 15-31 July 1958*, 5 November 1958. A copy of the document is located in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

47. David C. Martin and John Walcott, *Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism* (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 95-98.

48. Yates, *Power Pack*, 73.

49. *Ibid.*, 69; Frank, *U.S. Marines in Lebanon*, 24-25.

50. On ROE in general, see Mark S. Martins, "Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering," *Military Law Review* 143 (Winter 1994). For the Dominican intervention, see Yates, *Power Pack*, 140-43; for Panama, see author's manuscript on the Panama crisis prior to Operation JUST CAUSE (forthcoming from the US Army Center of Military History), and Clarence E. Briggs III, *Operation Just Cause: Panama 1989, A Soldier's Eyewitness Account* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1990).

51. On the organization and effectiveness of the CMOC in Somalia, see Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, 67-69; and Baumann and Yates, "My Clan Against the World," 53-55, 76-79.

52. For what could have been called "mission creep" in the Dominican intervention, see Yates, *Power Pack*; for Somalia, see Baumann and Yates, "My Clan Against the World."

53. For example, see *Field Artillery in Military Operations Other than War: An Overview of the US Experience* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004).

54. Complicating attempts to acquire cultural awareness is the adage that an understanding of another culture begins with a thorough grasp of one's own. Few historians in America would argue today that the population at large, or even those segments that have received degrees in higher education, have little more than a passing understanding of US history and American culture. As in all countries, what passes for history falls better into the categories of myth and legend.

55. For the Army's response to the counterinsurgency initiative, see Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era*; Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*; and Robert A. Doughty, *The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76*, Leavenworth Paper No. 1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 1979), 25-40.

56. Information regarding S/CRS as well as the matrix can be found at <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/>. Interestingly, in the budget battle of 2005, S/CRS fought to keep from being woefully underfunded.

57. FM 1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 2005).

58. In a telephone conversation on 11 January 2006, the author discussed the direction that doctrine for stability operations is taking with an Army officer responsible for writing that doctrine as a member of the Combine Arms Doctrine Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

59. The quotes on the focus area team are taken from briefing slides prepared at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in March 2005.

60. US Department of Defense, *Directive Number 3000.05*, 28 November 2005. For a brief but insightful journalistic assessment of the directive, see *The Christian Science Monitor*, 16 December 2005.

61. In the summer of 2005, a US Army officer in the Pentagon told the author and others that, within DOD, there is already a sizable group of officers who regard the current situation in Iraq as an aberration.



## About the Author

Dr. Yates served as a member of the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) from August 1981 until his retirement in September 2005. He was originally assigned to the research committee in 1986 and then reassigned as chief of the historical services committee in 1991. Dr. Yates has taught the Command and General Staff College's military history survey course and several elective courses, including "Case Studies in US Contingency Operations and Interventions since World War II." He has authored or coauthored several CSI publications, including Leavenworth Paper no. 15 entitled *Power Pack: US Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965–1966* and GWOT Occasional Paper no. 4 entitled *Field Artillery in Military Operations Other Than War*. He coedited and contributed to *Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations* and coauthored "My Clan Against the World": *US and Coalition Forces in Somalia*. During his tenure at CSI, Dr. Yates became known as one of the foremost experts in the world in the study of US peace-keeping and contingency operations.



## Appendix A

### Selected Case Studies in US Stability Operations, 1789-2005

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## Appendix B

### Overviews of Selected Case Studies in US Stability Operations The Second Seminole War, 1835-1842

As part of the US government's policy of relocating Indian groups living east of the Mississippi River to western territories, President Andrew Jackson in 1835 ordered ten Army companies into Florida to evict some 5,000 Seminole Indians. In December a Seminole war party attacked an Army column, thus precipitating the Second Seminole War, which lasted until 1835.

The Seminoles were organized into loose-knit clans that confounded the Army's early attempts to force a decisive battle through the conventional tactic of converging columns. Eventually the Army adopted unconventional tactics and techniques, but still had to contend with the swampy terrain and heat of Florida's Everglades and with political constraints imposed by Washington (for example, against the use of bloodhounds), both of which slowed progress in the war. Seven general officers commanded US troops in the war, and with one or two exceptions, their reputations suffered as a result. The last US commander, Colonel William Worth, adopted effective small-unit, search-and-destroy tactics aimed at Seminole villages and crops. By 1842 over 4,000 Seminoles had been removed from their land, and with fewer than 200 still offering resistance, the government considered the hostilities terminated. The Second Seminole War was the longest war in the country's history to that date, and one that forced officers and units oriented toward conventional tactics to adapt to an unconventional battlefield.

Mahon, John K. *History of the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842*. rev. ed.; Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Presses, 1991 (first edition 1967).

Prucha, Francis Paul. *Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846*. Paperback ed.; Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977.

## The Mexican War, 1846-1848

America's war with Mexico began in May 1846, was fought entirely on Mexican soil, and provided the US Army its first significant experience in military government. With no international guidelines to follow, the Army's general-in-chief, Winfield Scott, devised occupation policies that initially emphasized conciliation. The Army was to treat Mexican civilians as friends and protect their rights and property. Through proclamations and other forms of communication, Mexicans received assurances that the United States meant them no harm, posed no threat to their customs and religion, and fought only against the "tyrants" who constituted the current regime. Where possible, Scott governed through native municipal officials, allowed local elections, permitted the Mexican judiciary system to function, maintained public institutions, distributed food, sought improvements in public sanitation and morality, and, in Mexico City, provided 400 soldiers to augment the native police force.

As American soldiers and Scott's supply lines became targets of Mexican guerrillas, conciliation in many places yielded to harsher measures designed to exterminate the guerrillas and punish those civilians who supported them. Captured guerrillas were generally tried and summarily executed, while civilian supporters were subject to fines, the confiscation of their property, and, in extreme cases, the razing of their homes and villages. Though these harsh policies did not completely eliminate the guerrilla threat, they managed to hold it in check.

The United States signed a peace treaty with Mexico in February 1848. In June the last American troops left those areas that would remain under Mexican sovereignty. On the whole, the two-year US military occupation of Mexico was regarded as a largely benevolent and successful operation, despite the harsh anti-guerrilla policies and the acknowledged misconduct of many American soldiers.

Provost Marshal General's School, "Military Government under Winfield Scott," *Training Packet #58*, n.d.

Smith, Justin H. "American Rule in Mexico," *American Historical Review* 23 (January 1918) 287-302.

Wallace, Edward S. "The United States Army in Mexico City," *Military Affairs* 13 (1949) 158-66.

## Civil War Occupations, 1861-1865

Throughout America's Civil War, Union forces occupied captured southern territory and the so-called "border states" between North and South. For the troops assigned to occupied areas, the list of duties included guarding Union supply lines, maintaining order, and, in some cases, fighting rebel guerrillas. All told, it is estimated that, at some points in the war, occupation activities tied up as much as a third of the Union army.

While there were general, albeit changing, policy guidelines governing occupation policies throughout the war, the implementation of those guidelines varied according to location and circumstances. Some remote areas might not realize they were under occupation at all, while others in which rebel sympathizers and guerrillas were active might experience the full weight of martial law. The form of military occupation also varied from place to place. Generally upon occupying an area, the Army would first emphasize the need for a policing force and a military or civilian court system that would maintain or restore order. In some places, President Abraham Lincoln authorized military governments, which performed administrative functions, supervised elections, conducted a variety of public health and sanitation programs, monitored public morals, collected taxes, oversaw business and financial activities, provided basic services, and enacted labor laws. As the linchpin of the Army's administration of civil affairs, the provost marshal in a given area monitored the activities of suspected rebels, administered loyalty oaths, and arrested and prosecuted criminals as well as rebel activists.

During the first two years of the war, Union commanders in occupied areas sought to pursue lenient policies that would protect individual rights and property and promote reconciliation with the majority of Southerners whom President Lincoln assumed to be in favor of restoring the Union. This assumption proved false, and as guerrilla warfare and terror tactics against occupation forces and pro-Union officials and civilians intensified, and as pro-rebel civilians increasingly assisted the guerrillas, federal troops adopted harsher policies toward both the guerrillas and those who abetted them. Partisans who did not wear uniforms and who did not belong to formal units of the Confederate army often received no leniency if captured, while civilians who supported the guerrillas might face a number of penalties, including imprisonment, the loss of property, fines, banishment, and even death. General Order No. 100 codified how Union forces should treat guerrillas and recalcitrant civilians in occupied areas. The order sanctioned a combination of harsh and conciliatory policies that most Union commanders were already employing. Still, the document "marked

the first time a government had issued official guidelines regulating how its army should conduct itself in relation to an enemy's army and civilian population"(Birtle, 34).

After the war, the Army made little effort to study its occupation and counter-guerrilla policies. The whole experience was regarded as too unrewarding and too political to merit serious and continuous study. This disregard of the wartime experience is particularly interesting in light of the fact that the Army's responsibility for occupation and pacification of the South would carry over into Reconstruction.

Birtle, Andrew J. *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941*. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1998.

Grimsley, Mark. *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

## Reconstruction, 1865-1877

At the close of the Civil War, the US Army engaged in the challenging task of occupying the former Confederate states. Many Southern whites were outraged by the occupation and sought to restore pro-Confederate governments. Under President Andrew Johnson's generous plan of Presidential Reconstruction, it appeared an uncomplicated task, as southerners elected "unrepentant" governments, implemented Black Codes as a substitute for slavery, and committed many violent acts against freed blacks. While the Army sought to maintain order, Johnson repeatedly sided with white Southerners. When outraged Republicans in Congress attacked Johnson's lenient course of action, the Army became embroiled in a political battle.

In a series of groundbreaking legislative acts, Congress attacked Johnson's ideas and instituted a new Reconstruction plan. Congress declared the newly elected pro-Confederate governments merely provisional (except in Tennessee, which had already been reconstructed), and placed Army generals in command of large areas of the South with the power to remove any elected official from office. With US forces protecting black males and white Republicans at the polls, the Army helped establish pioneering, interracial Republican governments throughout the South. Soon, however, the Army found itself embroiled in having to protect those new governments and their supporters. In many instances, the Army was forced to quell race riots which exploded in the streets, as well as uprisings resulting from contested elections.

When Southern whites retaliated with terrorist organizations like the Ku Klux Klan, Congress and newly elected President Ulysses S. Grant responded by employing the Army as a posse comitatus. In conjunction with federal marshals and attorneys, the Army was able to temporarily destroy the power of the Klan.

In 1877 the Army's protective presence in the South came to an end. It had been a remarkable experience, one that required the Army to adjust to constantly changing national policy, while applying unparalleled military control over the southern states. By the time of the US military withdrawal from the South, however, virtually every state house had reverted to Democratic control by white supremacists.

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## Nation Building in the West

As the United States exercised its self-proclaimed “Manifest Destiny” and expanded beyond the original thirteen colonies on the Atlantic seaboard, the US Army led the way in the country’s westward movement to the Pacific Ocean. During this period, the United States acquired massive amounts of land to accommodate its growing population. As pioneers rushed into these new domains, the Army examined and mapped the new territories and provided an infrastructure for the new frontier. Road building and the construction of forts along the westward trails facilitated the rapid migration of a population eager to obtain new land.

As the American population moved west, the Army protected the transportation routes from hostile Indians. In many cases, the Army served in the unenviable position of peacemaker, as it attempted to keep the peace between the incoming settlers and outraged Indians who, in many cases, had been forcibly removed from their land. At various times, the Army protected Indians from white encroachment, but would also spend much of its time battling hostile Indian tribes.

During the westward expansion, as new settlements sprang up around distant Army forts, and pioneers moved farther away from established population centers, citizens often called on the Army for all manner of assistance, including law enforcement.

In the end, the US Army was a major catalyst in the growth of the nation. West Point trained officers and engineers helped cut a path into the wilderness and greatly influenced the rapid completion of the country’s “Manifest Destiny.”

Utley, Robert M. *Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967.

## Cuba, 1899-1902

The island of Cuba served as the flashpoint for the Spanish-American War that began in 1898. At the start of the war, Cuba was a Spanish colony. However, due to the presence of Cuban insurgents who had been fighting for independence since 1895, Spain's control of the island was tenuous. In 1899, after defeating Spanish naval and land forces in the Caribbean, the United States assumed responsibility for governing Cuba. Before the beginning of the war, Congress had rejected annexation of the island, but President William McKinley kept American forces in Cuba until the island's political, economic, and social systems had been reformed in the image of the United States.

As the occupation began, American soldiers quickly disbanded the Cuban insurgents by offering cash bonuses and jobs in exchange for their weapons. The Army then established a military government that incrementally returned authority to civilian Cuban administrators. Other reforms were equally cautious. US Army leaders in Cuba mandated small changes to Cuban law, attempting to minimize negative affects on the traditional social order. At the same time, the military government undertook projects that made improvements in the lives of the average Cuban, including the construction of roads, schools, and sewers. These projects employed a large number of Cubans and helped facilitate economic recovery. Perhaps most impressive was the Army Medical Corps' program to eradicate yellow fever and malaria which resulted in significant declines in reported cases of both diseases.

In 1902 President Theodore Roosevelt recognized that Cuba had matured politically and economically and granted the island independence. Under the new Cuban constitution, however, the country retained the status of an American protectorate, and the United States held the rights to have a naval base on the island. Once the troops departed, only a few of their reforms had any lasting impact. Cuban elites allowed the construction projects and the health programs established by the American soldiers to fade away. Political turmoil compelled Roosevelt to reoccupy the island with American troops in 1906. Ultimately, the US Army had assisted in the stabilization of Cuba and begun the process of recovery, even if it had not introduced enduring cultural change.

Birtle, Andrew J. *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941*. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1998.

Healy, David. *The United States in Cuba, 1898 – 1902: Generals, Politicians and the Search for Policy*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963.

## **The Philippines, 1899-1913**

In 1898 the United States went to war with Spain in a series of battles that took place, not in the country of Spain, but against Spanish forces in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, colonies determined to be the most important holdings in the declining Spanish empire. American forces quickly defeated the Spanish military, leaving the US in possession of the former Spanish holdings. With little guidance from President William McKinley's administration, the US Army occupied these territories and began to implement new policies focused on fostering prosperous and democratic societies. While Cuba would be given its independence in 1902, the Philippines became an American colony in 1899.

Despite the McKinley administration's emphasis on democracy and economic prosperity, not all Filipinos were content with their status as subjects of the United States. In February 1899 armed Filipinos under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo and other nationalists engaged in open hostilities with US troops occupying Manila. While the war began as a conventional conflict, the overwhelming firepower of the United States forced Aguinaldo and the others to adopt guerilla tactics as the fighting spread across the archipelago.

Over the course of the next 13 years, the US Army fought the insurgency using a variety of policies and techniques. Much of the conflict was waged by small platoon- or company-sized units located in distant outposts isolated from each other and higher headquarters. Because of this, local American commanders tailored their policies and procedures to meet the conditions specific to their area of responsibility. In general, these officers used a combination of civil affairs and humanitarian projects and counterinsurgent operations to combat the guerillas. The formation of pro-American local governments, the construction of schools, and the establishment of public health programs were all designed to win the support of the civilian population. American commanders often supplemented these humanitarian efforts with active patrolling, destruction of villages that supported the insurgents, and population relocation programs. Another critical element in the American pacification campaign was the aggressive gathering of intelligence, which sometimes included the use of torture to gain information from suspected guerillas.

This combination of benevolent and punitive methods led to the gradual stabilization of the Philippines. By 1903 most of the insurgents on Luzon and some of the smaller islands in the northern part of the archipelago had been pacified. However, resistance continued in the south, where, for

example, the Moros, a Muslim people on the southern island of Mindanao, continued their own insurgency against American forces until 1913. The final pacification of Mindanao in that year allowed the Army to turn over complete control of the island to American civilian administrators and return most of the regular American forces to the United States.

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Linn, Brian M. *The US Army and the Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902*. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989.

## **China Relief Expedition, 1900-1901**

The China Relief Expedition is the official designation for America's military response to China's Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Five years earlier, the stage had been set for the rebellion when, as a result of the central Chinese imperial government's weakness, Japan defeated China in a brief war, providing the opportunity for foreign powers, namely Japan, Russia, Germany, and Great Britain, to establish geographically defined spheres of influence in China. A secret Chinese society with the name of "Righteous and Harmonious Fists" (shortened to "the Boxers" in the Western press) first attacked institutions of the weakened central Chinese government, but then was co-opted by that government and used to attack foreign interests.

In June 1900, in a military action that became known as the "Boxer Rebellion," Boxer paramilitary forces attacked the area of the Chinese capital city of Peking where many foreigners lived and where many diplomatic legations were located. The killing of the German ambassador on 20 June 1900 prompted eight nations to form an alliance and send troops quickly to China to relieve their besieged delegations. The coalition included about 55,000 forces from Japan, Russia, Great Britain, France, the United States, Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Italy.

The bulk of the American force, comprised of the 9th and 14th Infantry Regiments, then stationed in the Philippines, was dispatched to China and placed under the command of Major General Adna R. Chaffee. US naval and marine forces also participated in the armed response. The multinational ground force, commanded by the British Brigadier General A.R.F. Dorward, marched from the port of Tientsin to Peking and quickly defeated the Chinese Imperial and Boxer forces, numbering from 120,000 to 170,000 troops. The Chinese government, in September 1901, was forced to pay over \$300 million in war reparations and to sign a peace agreement that granted additional concessions to foreign powers. This further weakened the Imperial government, contributing to its collapse five years later.

General Chaffee carried out the administration of the American zone of occupation (several square miles of territory and approximately 50,000 inhabitants) based on his previous experiences in the American West and in the occupation of Cuba. The Americans imposed civil order, reestablished Chinese police and judicial institutions, took measures to improve public sanitation and eradicate disease, repaired infrastructure, and improved the living conditions of the population. The American occupation was remark-

able for its discipline, order, and efficiency. General Chaffee and the bulk of his US Army occupation force left China in early 1901.

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“General Chaffee’s Report on the China Relief Expedition,” in *U.S. War Department, Five Years of the War Department Following the War With Spain, 1899-1903*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904. Document available on-line; available at [www.shsu.edu/~his\\_ncp/China.html](http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/China.html), last accessed on 4 November 2005.

## **Mexico (Veracruz), 1914**

In early April 1914 Mexican soldiers in Tampico arrested several US sailors who had come ashore on routine business. The men were soon released, but President Woodrow Wilson used the incident as a pretext for intervening in Mexico, then in the throes of a major revolution. Specifically, Wilson desired the replacement of the dictatorial regime of General Victoriano Huerta with a constitutional government. When, soon after the Tampico affair, the president learned that a shipment of arms for Huerta would arrive at Veracruz, he ordered the US Navy to seize the customs house in that Mexican port. On 21 April American marines and sailors assaulted the city and, after a short but violent battle, gained complete control of the port area. Although the bloodshed caused Wilson to call off the US Army's plan to march on Mexico City, he remained determined to hold the city until Huerta stepped down as the Mexican president. On 30 April a brigade of the US Army under the command of Brigadier General Frederick Funston landed at Veracruz to begin a seven-month occupation of the city. The occupation was widely denounced by nearly all sides in the revolution, even those opposing Huerta.

While American military forces began their occupation duties in Veracruz, politicians from several South American countries attempted to mediate a peace between the United States, Huerta, and Huerta's principal political rival, Constitutionalist Venustiano Carranza. Meanwhile, the city was a cesspool of disease, and the new American military government wasted no time in instituting a robust health and sanitation policy. The Americans cleared away massive amounts of garbage and debris and burned the accumulated waste. The US Army also instituted an extensive public works program in order to clean up the city's marketplace where the food goods were infested with maggots and filth. American soldiers removed stagnant water from the city streets and took charge of the water and sewage facilities. Intent on eradicating disease, they also provided vaccinations to the entire population of Veracruz and hospitalized prostitutes infected with diseases. In no time, the mortality rate among the native population fell by more than 25 percent. In addition to matters of public health, the US occupation attempted to reform the city's civil government and judicial and penal systems.

On 15 July 1914 Huerta removed himself from Mexican politics and fled the country, while Carranza and General Francisco Villa and Emiliano Zapata battled over the spoils. However, it was not until 23 November that the Americans evacuated Veracruz.

While the American occupation of Veracruz was seen by many as an overt act of Yankee imperialism, American military forces had in fact conducted themselves in a professional and compassionate manner. When the US Army pulled out of Veracruz, they left behind a far healthier and better organized city. The changes did not survive the American withdrawal.

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Eisenhower, John S. D. *Intervention! The United States and the Mexican Revolution, 1913-1917*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993.

## Interventions in Russia, 1918-1920

Land and naval forces of the United States, Canada, and several European and Asian nations intervened in the Russian civil war from July 1918 until 1922. Participating nations, in addition to the United States, included Canada, Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Serbia, Poland, Romania, China, and Japan. While each nation in the coalition had its own geo-political and military purposes in supporting the intervention, the common objectives were several: guard vast amounts of military supplies that had accumulated in and around the ports of Vladivostok in the east, and Murmansk and Archangel in the far North, secure the eastern end of the Trans-Siberian Railway in Siberia to allow Czechoslovakian troops to link up with freed Czechoslovakian prisoners of war in the interior of Siberia, and, in the case of the European powers and Japan, assist forces attempting to overturn the recently established Bolshevik regime.

The US ground force contribution to the intervention included approximately 9,000 soldiers of the 27th and 31st Infantry Regiments in the Vladivostok sector, and soldiers (about 5,500) from the 339th Infantry Regiment and supporting units of the 85th Infantry Division in the Archangel sector. The US units in northern Russia were subordinated to a British coalition commander, but the commander of US troops in Siberia, while acting as part of an international force, resisted attempts to place his men under the direct control of the coalition's Japanese commander. An American naval officer, Admiral Austin M. Knight, commanded the coalition naval forces at Vladivostok.

After a winter of skirmishing alongside coalition forces against Bolshevik military units south of Archangel, in June 1919 the American contingent in North Russia withdrew. The American forces in the Vladivostok region began to redeploy back to the Philippines in January 1920. Total combined US losses to sporadic enemy hostilities and disease were approximately 400 men. Any stability imposed on the respective regions by the presence of coalition forces was obviated by the ultimate Bolshevik victory in the Russian civil war that ended in 1922. The American intervention in Russia remained a point of contention in Soviet-American diplomatic relations for decades afterward.

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## Haiti, 1915-1934

In 1915 the United States landed marine forces in Haiti with the goal of establishing a stable and democratic regime in the chronically troubled nation. This was not the first time that American forces had become involved in Haiti. Indeed, between 1857 and 1915, the United States had mounted over a dozen serious interventions in Haitian affairs. By 1915 however, the stakes in the Caribbean were higher. American officials had begun to view Haiti's chronic instability as a possible trigger for the intervention of Europe's Great Powers in the Caribbean region. This fear, coupled with concerns about American commercial interests in Haiti, led the United States to send in the marines when the Haitian government underwent another period of political turmoil.

The Marine Corps quickly took control of the capital city of Port-au-Prince and began efforts to return stability to the region. In short order, American officers became involved in reforming the Haitian administrative system, supervising the nation's finances, and writing a new constitution for a new democratic regime. To prevent Haitian political elites from undoing these reforms, US representatives pushed the Haitian National Assembly to approve a new president selected by the American command.

With the new regime installed, American forces began two large-scale programs designed to restore order and bring civic improvements to Haiti. First, the Marine Corps, with the help of the Navy, began a program of projects to greatly improve the Haitian infrastructure. During the occupation, marines supervised the construction of bridges, harbors, airfields, and a road network. The Navy's Medical Corps oversaw the construction of new hospitals and clinics and initiated public health campaigns designed to stamp out malaria and other debilitating diseases that plagued Haitian society.

The second critical program was the establishment of a Haitian constabulary. However, that same year, an insurrection in the northern part of the nation made it obvious that the relatively small marine contingent would need help in maintaining order. The Marine Corps was tasked not only with the training of the new constabulary but its leadership as well. For much of the occupation, individual marines served as the constabulary's officer corps, directing it in public works projects as well as in operations against the insurgencies that periodically erupted in the rural areas of Haiti.

The American occupation of Haiti lasted 19 years. In 1934 President

Franklin D. Roosevelt recalled the marines, who left a mixed legacy in their wake. By the 1920s, the American presence had created a large measure of stability and certainly improved Haiti's physical infrastructure. However, local resentment towards the occupation had never completely disappeared and once the marines departed, the Haitians abandoned many of the programs and institutions established by the Americans, including most importantly the political stability the marines had instilled. Less than four years after the marines' departure, the commander of the Haitian constabulary attempted to overthrow the constitutional government in Port-au-Prince and Haiti fell back into a pattern of political and social upheaval that would continue for the next two decades.

Boot, Max. *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*. New York: Basic Books, 2002.

McCrocklin, James H. *Garde D'Haiti: Twenty Years of Organization and Training by the United States Marine Corps*. Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval Institute Press, 1956.

## **Dominican Republic, 1916-1924**

The primary cause for the United States intervention in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924 was strategic—to protect the southern approaches to the US coast and the eastern approaches to the Panama Canal from foreign control. The United States also had a strategic interest in maintaining its economic interests in much of the Caribbean region. The 1916 occupation of the Dominican Republic was part of a pattern of US intervention in the affairs of several Caribbean states in the 15 years preceding World War I. In this specific case, US involvement was precipitated by a revolution that threatened to topple the local government in Santo Domingo. Left to itself, continuing political and economic chaos in the country could disrupt US economic interests and possibly invite foreign intervention.

The occupation was characterized by widespread cooperation between local officials and American occupation authorities in several areas of activity, but also by guerrilla warfare between indigenous forces and US marines in the eastern region of the country and politico-intellectual protest in both the Dominican Republic and abroad. Military occupation forces implemented reforms in local political, economic, and social institutions, engaged in projects to develop and improve the nation's public health and physical infrastructure, and established a constabulary system, which after the marines' departure, became the armed fist of the 30-year dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo.

A regiment of marines, led by Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton, arrived in the Dominican Republic in late June 1916. The command apparatus that evolved over the next several months was a Marine brigade headquarters commanded first by Pendleton, then Brigadier General Ben H. Fuller in August 1918, and finally by Brigadier General Harry Lee in August 1921. Subordinate to the brigade were initially two and, later, three regiments, each of which had responsibility for a geographical section of the country. Battalions and companies were stationed in towns and villages to enforce the occupation. From 1916 to 1922, the affairs of the Dominican Republic were managed by three US government agencies—the Departments of State, Navy, and War. The Department of the Navy remained the strongest of the three departments from early 1917 until late 1922. The military government that was formally established in late November 1916 remained in power through a succession of military governors until August 1922, when the US Department of State effectively gained control in advance of the selection of a new, provisional Dominican government. As the Dominican political structure reemerged in 1923 and 1924, US Marine units were

gradually withdrawn until the last marine left the country on 18 September 1924.

Calder, Bruce J. *The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the U.S. Occupation of 1916-1924*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1984.

## Nicaragua 1927-1933

In 1926 Nicaragua was in the midst of an armed civil conflict among liberal and conservative militias controlled by various political strongmen. Concerned with the rising chaos and the threats it posed to US security and business interests in the region, Washington ordered marines into Nicaragua to separate the warring factions and, following that, to enforce the terms of a settlement negotiated by US diplomats. The marines compelled the disarming of all the factions save one: the forces led by liberal commander, Augusto César Sandino, who, beginning in 1927, launched an all-out effort to topple the US-supported government in Managua and eject the US marines from Nicaragua. At first, the fighting was strictly conventional, but the preponderance of American firepower forced Sandino to adopt guerrilla tactics against his adversaries. The marines and the *Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua* (a Nicaraguan military organization created by the marines) in turn devised a counterinsurgency campaign aimed directly at Sandino and his supporters.

Although Sandino and his Army in Defense of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua were legitimate combatants, US policy makers declared Sandino and his men to be nothing more than bandits, opening the door for the use of excessive force against both Sandino's forces and, in many cases, the civilian population who supported them. Marine aviation also conducted bombing runs on guerrilla strongholds and sanctuaries. Many of these actions strengthened the local support for Sandino and rallied a large portion of the population to his cause. Constraining the marines' counterinsurgency campaign were political restrictions preventing the pursuit of guerrilla bands into Honduras and forbidding programs to relocate the civilian population from areas friendly to Sandino.

In 1933 the marines withdrew from Nicaragua, and Sandino declared an end to the hostilities. The commander of the *Guardia Nacional*, having agreed to meet with the guerrilla leader, arranged for his assassination. In 1936 Somoza and the *Guardia* toppled the elected government and established a military dictatorship led by Somoza and supported by the United States. Somoza and his two sons would rule Nicaragua until 1979.

Macaulay, Neill. *The Sandino Affair*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985.

## Germany, 1945-1949

The occupation of Germany after World War II is perhaps the paradigm of a successful postcombat operation in modern American history. After four years of bitter fighting and some initial friction between American combat units and the defeated German population, the US Army shifted from its combat missions and literally reorganized and retrained its forces for their new peacetime role. The US Constabulary in Europe effectively bridged the gap between the victorious Allies and the defeated populace by providing aggressive law enforcement, border control, and assistance to the Germans in rebuilding their country's infrastructure. The presence of American soldiers also served as a symbol of the United States' resolve to reconstruct a devastated Germany and help shape it into a trusted friend and ally.

Initially, tactical units deployed across the region to maintain order and security while the Germans began the arduous process of rebuilding their country. The challenges were daunting in the face of the massive destruction caused by the war and the flood of refugees into the Zone of Occupation. Redeployment of US forces earmarked for the Pacific theater and the demobilization of units returning to the United States compounded the challenges faced by American forces remaining in Germany. However, to assist the downsized American forces, the US Constabulary was formed in the summer of 1946 to serve as the dedicated occupation and law enforcement element. With specialized training and distinctive uniforms, these soldiers assisted the rebuilding of the German law enforcement agencies, countered the black market, and controlled the international and inter-zonal borders.

The post-World War II occupation of Germany, spanning almost 11 years, was a massive and diverse undertaking involving Britain, France, and the Soviet Union and, to varying degrees, a multitude of US government departments and agencies. Moreover, the occupation was a major event in German history and in the history of the postwar world.

Fredericksen, Oliver J. *The American Occupation of Germany, 1945 – 1953*. Darmstadt, GE: Stars and Stripes Printing, 1953.

Gott, Kendall D. *Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1953*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005.

Libby, Brian A. *Policing Germany: The United States Constabulary, 1946-1952*. Ph.D. thesis, Purdue University, 1977.

Ziemke, Earl F. *The US Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946*. Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, 1989.

Zink, Harold, *The United States in Germany 1944-1955*. New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1957.

## **Austria, 1945-1955**

The United States reluctantly joined the Allied occupation of Austria from 1945 to 1955, responsible for one of four zones of occupation and a section of Vienna. There existed an immediate need to establish Austria's legal status after the war, though many argued that the country had willingly accepted German annexation in 1938. In accordance with the Moscow Declaration of 1943, Austria was extended a better status than Germany, contingent upon active assistance to the occupiers.

Planning for the occupation of Austria began in earnest as the war drew to a close. However, the planners at the Departments of State and War had major differences of opinion over questions of command responsibility and participation in the postwar occupation. The War Department actually opposed the occupation of Austria on the grounds that it was unnecessary, but the State Department persuaded President Franklin D. Roosevelt to join the British and the Soviet Union in stationing troops in the country. Arguments also arose between the British representatives of the European Advisory Commission and the combined British and American Chiefs of Staff, as well as the senior military commanders who were more focused on winning the war before addressing occupation duties.

The occupation of Austria in 1945 presented a host of challenges. Territorial demands were made by the Soviets to extend their zone of responsibility, and Yugoslavian troops left the region of Carinthia only under threat of force. These difficulties were largely resolved by July 1945, but remaining challenges, including denazification, placement of thousands of refugees, and economic reform, would take months or years to implement. Unfortunately, the growing friction caused by the developing Cold War impeded progress.

As Austria continued to cooperate with the occupiers and adopted a neutrality policy, it was allowed great freedom and flexibility. Elections were held in late 1945, and in 1946 the Allied powers gave up their unilateral veto power of Austrian legislation. Instead, the need for a unanimous vote by the four major powers was required. The Soviet Union resisted many of these measures, attempting to block Austria's participation in the Marshall Plan and its membership in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

The Soviet Union was finally willing to settle Austria's status permanently in 1955. After months of negotiation, the final treaty was signed on 15 May, forbidding unification with Germany and the return of the Hapsburg monarchy; it also provided safeguards for ethnic minorities. By the

end of 1955 all Allied troops had been withdrawn from Austria.

Carafano, James J. *Waltzing Into the Cold War: The Struggle for Occupied Austria*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002.

Snyder, James M. *The Establishment and Operations of the United States Constabulary*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), 1947.

Whitnah, Donald R. and Edgar L. Erickson. *The American Occupation of Austria: Planning and Early Years*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985.

## Japan, 1945-1951

Following Japan's defeat in World War II, the US military occupied that country in conjunction with the terms identified in the Potsdam Agreement. By those terms, the two primary goals of the occupation of Japan were the complete demilitarization of the Japanese military complex and the democratization of Japanese society. US Army General Douglas MacArthur was appointed as the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) and was responsible for administering the Japanese occupation.

General MacArthur's plan for the occupation of Japan was known as Operation BLACKLIST and had been in development by his staff since May 1945. This plan was itself grounded in research and planning documents developed primarily in the US Department of State as early as 1941. The two phases of the occupation included a brief initial phase (which lasted approximately 60 days) of disarmament and demobilization, followed by a longer phase devoted to political and economic reform that lasted several years. A key factor in the success of both phases was the early decision to work through Japanese government and administrative organizations, rather than to dismantle and replace them.

Pursuant to this decision, the following divisions were established to oversee existing Japanese government bureaus: government, economy and science, natural resources, public health and welfare, civil intelligence, legal, civil information and education, civil property custodian, and diplomacy. These divisions were staffed by US civil servants and former military officers, approximately 3,500 of them at the peak in 1948.

Guided by MacArthur's policies, the new Japanese government instituted many far-reaching changes in Japanese politics, society, and culture. Economic reforms imposed on the Japanese government included democratization of economic opportunity, land reform, and expansion of the scope and quality of workers' rights. So successful was the Allied forces' occupation policy in Japan that the Japanese Diet approved a new constitution for the nation in 1947. The US occupation of Japan formally ended on 28 April 1952 after Japan and representatives of the 46 Allied nations signed a peace treaty in San Francisco on 8 September 1951.

Cavalieri, David P. *Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005.

## **South Korea, 1945-1950**

When World War II ended in the Pacific theater in 1945, American soldiers were thrust into the roles of occupiers and peace keepers. The focus of postwar recovery operations in the Pacific region was Japan, but the Army also sent the XXIV Corps to the Korean peninsula to deal with the surrender of Japanese forces that had occupied the country since 1905. A US-Soviet agreement split the Korean peninsula into two occupation zones along the 38th parallel, and American forces were established south of that line.

Initially, the US force in Korea concentrated on taking the surrender of Japanese units and repatriating those units to Japan while establishing law and order in southern Korea. However, in 1946 when tensions developed between the Soviet and American authorities over plans for the Korean peninsula, the United States formed a military government that attempted to create a stable environment in which the two occupation zones could be politically united. During the two years that the United States controlled the southern zone, many American officers within the military government became heavily involved in negotiations, preparing the Koreans for eventual independence. However, a large number of soldiers supervised other stability operations designed to reinvigorate the rural economy, reestablish the judicial system, and rebuild the education system.

Unfortunately, as critical as these programs were to the establishment of stability on the Korean peninsula, they became less important in the larger struggle to secure the future of South Korea. A small number of American advisers became involved in the training and equipping of the Korean constabulary as early as 1946. In 1947 American leaders in Korea began expanding this effort. This change was a direct result of increased concerns about communist threats of invasion from the north and the very real communist-led insurrections erupting in the southern regions in 1948.

In the two years before the Korean War, the primary mission of the US Army in South Korea was to help transform the Korean constabulary into a force that could defend the south from both communist guerillas and a North Korean army that continued to make threats. On the eve of war, the new Republic of Korea (ROK) army consisted of 95,000 soldiers organized into eight divisions and equipped with American weapons and vehicles. In the war that began in 1950, American advisers served with the new army they had helped create in an attempt to defeat the invading communist forces and safeguard the emerging democracy in South Korea.

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Sawyer, Robert K. *Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War*. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1962.

## Lebanon, 1958

In May 1958 Lebanese President Camille Chamoun sent an urgent cable to US President Dwight D. Eisenhower requesting military aid to quell civil unrest in Lebanon. Chamoun claimed communist supported Syrian weapons and men were crossing his borders and leading his political opponents in an armed insurrection against his pro-American government. Chamoun was seeking US assistance because he believed his army would mutiny and disintegrate if ordered into action against Muslim rebels.

The 1958 revolt was instigated, in part, by Lebanese Muslims and Druze, who were inspired by the February 1958 unification of Egypt and Syria and were receptive to the Pan-Arab Nationalism espoused by Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser. Also at issue, and drawing in other opposition groups, were charges of political corruption against the government and an attempt by Chamoun to retain the presidency for a second term, a violation of the Lebanese political system.

The Eisenhower administration was wary of committing US troops to Lebanon, but following the overthrow of a pro-American government in Iraq and the murder of the Iraqi royal family by nationalist elements within the military, Eisenhower ordered some 5,000 marines ashore south of Beirut. US Army units out of Europe would follow in a matter of days. The role of the US forces, in a situation described by the Department of Defense as “like war but not war,” was to support the legal Lebanese government against any foreign invasion, specifically Syria. Once it became clear that Syrian forces were not going to intervene in Lebanon, the American troops engaged in a show of force around Beirut that helped stabilize the situation and allowed US negotiators to arrange a political settlement that ended the conflict. By the end of October, all American forces had left the country.

Making the US withdrawal possible was the agreement by most Lebanese opposition groups to elect a new president, General Fuad Chehab, who enjoyed widespread respect throughout the country. During the 1960s and early 1970s, the 1958 accords held, and Lebanon enjoyed a period of relative calm that would not be broken until the outbreak of civil war in the mid-1970s.

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## **Vietnam, 1955-1973**

While the overall mission of the US military forces in southern Vietnam was to support the Republic of Vietnam's government and armed forces in their military struggle against both internal insurgents and invaders from the north, there existed also an important parallel mission. This second war, the pacification program, had a single overarching purpose: to develop loyalty and support for the local and national government among the people of South Vietnam.

Early nonmilitary assistance to the Republic of Vietnam was provided by the International Cooperation Administration and the Development Loan Fund—the same entities created to implement the Marshall Plan in Europe. As early as June 1955, resources from these two organizations were directed toward land reform programs and training for South Vietnamese police forces and intelligence services in counterinsurgency tactics.

In 1961 President John F. Kennedy created the US Agency for International Development (USAID), an independent federal agency that received its policy guidance from the State Department. Between 1962 and 1975, thousands of USAID workers were embedded throughout South Vietnam, helping to establish schools and medical treatment facilities, build transportation and utilities infrastructure, and administer many other forms of nonmilitary assistance to the Vietnamese people. Unfortunately, management of these largely civilian-run programs was not well coordinated in Saigon with senior embassy and military command officials. As part of the pacification/counterinsurgency plan, Kennedy also increased the number of US military advisers working with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and local defense forces.

When President Lyndon B. Johnson met with the heads of the South Vietnamese government in Honolulu in February 1966, pacification was stated as one of three components of the Johnson administration's strategy, the other two being military pressure and negotiations. Upon his return to Washington, Johnson appointed Robert W. Komer as a special assistant for pacification in Vietnam. Komer worked tirelessly in Washington for the remainder of 1966 to subordinate all pacification organizations and activities to General William C. Westmoreland's Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). In the face of determined opposition from Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Johnson set a 90-day deadline for a civilian solution to the organizational problem.

The solution, the Office of Civil Operations, was created in Novem-

ber 1966. It combined the personnel and activities of USAID and several other civilian organizations. It employed about a thousand American civilians and directed a program budget of \$128 million and four billion South Vietnamese piastres. Meanwhile, Westmoreland created within his MACV headquarters a Revolutionary Development Support Directorate and named a general officer as its director. The Office of Civil Operations was short-lived—it was succeeded in early May 1967 by the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program. The first director of CORDS was Komer, who enjoyed direct access to Westmoreland, through his status as a MACV deputy, and to US Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, through his appointment at ambassadorial rank.

The CORDS program was implemented through a command and control structure that paralleled or was intertwined with the military command structure down to the province senior adviser level. In addition to all pacification activities, CORDS was also responsible for providing advice and support to the South Vietnamese militia, conducting the war against the enemy's clandestine politico-military command and administrative infrastructure (the PHOENIX program), and coordinating with the South Vietnamese government for recovery after the 1968 Tet offensive. When Komer accepted the offer from Johnson to become US ambassador to Turkey in October 1968, he was succeeded as director of CORDS by William Colby. Colby and the new MACV commander, General Creighton Abrams, both strongly believed in the CORDS mission and worked cooperatively toward its accomplishment until the final withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam in early 1973. The feeling of many who participated in the program was that it had been highly effective, but came too late to alter the war's outcome.

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## **Dominican Republic, 1965-1966**

After Fidel Castro led Cuba into the sphere of communist nations in 1959, the United States interest in the affairs of Caribbean nations increased significantly. Specific interest in the affairs of the Dominican Republic was amplified when that country experienced a revolt that overthrew a pro-American government in late April 1965. The revolt, which Washington believed was being controlled by key communists, was opposed militarily by many Dominican officers. When those "loyalist" forces were repulsed by the rebels, however, President Lyndon B. Johnson, stating the need to protect American lives and property in the Dominican Republic, ordered marines and the 82nd Airborne Division to deploy to Santo Domingo to stabilize the situation. The principal mission of the intervening force was to keep the country from falling to the communists.

Within a week after the initial alert, Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, the US force commander in the Dominican Republic, had two battalions of the 82nd on the ground east of the capital and a 500-man Marine force on the western edge of the city. This force was soon reinforced by four more battalions of paratroopers. Palmer quickly moved three airborne battalions through the city to link up with the marines and establish a buffer zone between the two main warring factions. By the end of the first week of May, the entire 82nd Airborne Division was in the country.

The combined Army-Marine force soon numbered about 20,000 troops. Palmer directed subordinate commanders to begin stability operations and soon the troops were conducting constabulary operations and distributing food, water, and medical supplies to the members of both factions. After mid-May, the buffer zone and the actions of the American military forces made it almost impossible for a renewal of general fighting, although sniper fire, including much directed into the American sector, was an almost daily occurrence.

The Organization of American States (OAS) was not happy with this latest evidence of American involvement in the internal affairs of a Latin American nation. Nevertheless, under US pressure, the OAS organized a coalition force, the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), from six countries (Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay) to deploy to the Dominican Republic and help the US forces there maintain law and order. To underscore the multinational effort, a Brazilian lieutenant general was soon appointed to command the IAPF, with Palmer as his deputy and the commander of the US military element within the coalition.

By September 1965 a provisional government had been established which prepared for elections to reestablish a legitimate government. By the end of 1965, only three battalions of the 82nd were still in the country. In June 1966 the national elections took place; by the end of September,

all US and other IAPF troops had been withdrawn from the Dominican Republic.

The Johnson administration was roundly criticized in Latin America and at home for its intervention in the Dominican Republic. Still, from both a military and a political standpoint, the intervention undoubtedly saved lives, restored law and order, and enabled the people to eventually install a democratically elected government.

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## **Latin America, 1960-1989**

As the Cold War began to take shape after World War II, the US government began to reassess its foreign policy in terms of the new struggle against the Soviet Union and its Marxist allies. While American policymakers had been very interested in Latin America since the early 19th century, the US interest in and concern about its southern neighbors grew more acute in the 1960s as it became evident, after Castro's success in Cuba, that the political, social and economic fragility of many Latin America states left them vulnerable to communist revolution.

To address this vulnerability, the US government followed an inter-agency approach to support stable regimes in many of the region's countries. American policymakers hoped that these governments would fend off Marxist guerillas while moving their societies toward democracy and economic prosperity. The US Army's role in this policy was twofold. First, the Army attempted to help the regimes of this region establish effective military institutions. American military advisory groups worked to train and equip the armed forces of these states. In the late 1960s, for example, there were hundreds of SF soldiers in Guatemala involved in the training of the Guatemalan army. The American advisory effort in this region remained important into the 1980s as US Army advisers in El Salvador and Honduras became involved in preparing indigenous forces to fight domestic insurgencies. Supplementing this training was the more formal military education courses for Latin American officers offered at the US Army School of the Americas, originally located at an American base in Panama and then moved to Fort Benning, Georgia.

The Army's second role, civic action, complemented its advisory programs. Beginning in the 1960s, American soldiers worked in several Latin American states to build stability by improving the economic and social infrastructure. By the 1980s, the Army was conducting large-scale civic action operations, many of which involved Army Reserve and National Guard units deployed to Panama and other Latin American countries to build roads, schools, and other facilities.

Honduras became the site of the Army's most ambitious civic action program. Between 1983 and 1989, American soldiers were involved in training Honduran health care workers, immunizing large segments of the rural population and even providing veterinary services to Honduran farmers. They also made large-scale improvements to the infrastructure, building schools, airfields, roads and wells. The success of this program and as well as that of the advisory mission in El Salvador illustrated the

US Army's ability to foster stability and assist in reconstruction efforts in very volatile environments.

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## **Beirut, 1982-1984**

In early June 1982 Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) invaded Lebanon to stop cross-border attacks against the Jewish state by elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in southern Lebanon. At the time of the invasion, the various Lebanese politico-religious factions were in the midst of a full-scale civil war, which had precipitated Syrian military intervention in 1976. Once the IDF cut through Syrian and PLO forces in the south, Israeli units moved north attacking remaining elements of the PLO, including its top leadership, in Beirut. This attack became an international public relations disaster for Israel, forcing Israeli political leaders to agree to the evacuation of the PLO out of the country. In August a multinational force, which included US marines, entered Beirut to assist in the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon.

In mid-September the new president of Lebanon, a Christian Phalangist who promised national reconciliation, was assassinated. In retaliation, his followers massacred Palestinians in two refugee camps in suburbs of Beirut. To prevent a renewal of the civil war, virtually all parties involved called for a new multinational force (MNF), including US marines, to enter Lebanon and help stabilize the situation around Beirut until a new national government could begin effective operations. The marines were ordered into a permissive environment where their mission was to provide a “presence” that would contribute to the process of stabilization. They would also help train and reorganize the Lebanese armed forces (LAF). For several months the operations of the MNF proceeded with minimal disruption. But in the first half of 1983, several factions in Lebanon, including newly arrived militant groups from revolutionary Iran, engaged in armed conflict. Gradually, the marines were drawn into the fighting.

On 18 April the US embassy was attacked by a suicide bomber driving a delivery van packed with about 400 pounds of explosives. The blast collapsed the front section of the embassy and killed 63 people. It was the deadliest attack on a US diplomatic mission up to that time, and is seen by some as marking the beginning of anti-US attacks by Islamic groups.

By late July Marine positions at Beirut International Airport were coming under sporadic but persistent fire. In September after the Israelis withdrew their forces from the area around Beirut, the LAF tried to fill the consequent military vacuum. In the fighting that resulted between the Lebanese government forces and their opponents, the marines’ impartiality in the crisis was called into question, and attacks against them intensified. The culmination of this fighting came on 23 October when a yellow

delivery truck loaded with the equivalent of 12,000 pounds of TNT destroyed the Marine headquarters building. The death toll was 241 American servicemen: 220 marines, 18 Navy personnel, and 3 Army soldiers. Sixty Americans were injured. An identical attack occurred on the French paratrooper barracks nearby.

The bombing of the Marine headquarters led to a policy debate in Washington, the outcome of which was a decision to withdraw the marines, but only over a period of several months. The situation in Lebanon remained chaotic for the remainder of the decade.

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## **Grenada, 1983**

In March 1979 the Marxist New Jewel Movement (NJM) came to power via a coup d'état in Grenada, a small Caribbean island nation about 190 kilometers due north of Venezuela. Due to the severe economic problems in Grenada, the leader of the NJM, Maurice Bishop, turned to Fidel Castro for assistance. Soon, numerous East European and Cuban "tourists" were arriving in large numbers.

Bishop's cozy relationship with the Castro regime, coupled with his refusal to organize democratic elections, soon caused political friction between the United States and Grenada. Complicating the problem was the expansion of the Port Salines airport by Cuban engineers that would enable it to handle large, heavy aircraft, ostensibly to support increased "tourist" traffic. The construction, however, led American intelligence officials to believe that Castro intended to use it to support Cuban military activities in Central and South America and in Africa.

Besides US hostility, Bishop also faced opposition from more radical elements within the NJM. On 13 October 1983 he was arrested, and a new government under General Austin Hudson was formed. Pro-Bishop elements of the population demonstrated against his arrest, and Bishop was freed only to be recaptured and executed, along with former members of his cabinet. Many among the demonstrators were also shot by government forces. Washington had been monitoring these events and, with Bishop's execution, concluded that American medical students on the island were in danger. As a result, President Ronald Reagan ordered the Department of Defense to intervene militarily, not just to protect the students, but to overthrow the existing regime and restore democracy. On 23 October 1983 Operation URGENT FURY was executed.

At about 0500 on 25 October, the invasion began, with US SOF and US marines assaulting key airfield and government targets. Over the next several days, Army, Marine, and Navy forces swept over the island ferreting out pockets of resistance. By the following day, the most of the US students had been rescued and evacuated from the island. Two days later, all resistance ceased. The marines began pulling out on 2 November, soon followed by the Rangers, and then the troops of the 82nd Airborne Division. The primary mission of protecting the students from harm was accomplished, as was the secondary mission of ridding Grenada of Cuban and Soviet influences.

A great deal of foreign aid poured into Grenada after the intervention, but the US military's role in the postconflict stability operations was lim-

ited. After the departure of US troops, Grenadians experienced relatively little social upheaval, and while the vast majority of Grenadians were supportive of the US intervention, in the long run, they became more dependent on US aid rather than productive citizens of a truly self-reliant nation that could fend for itself economically.

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## **Panama, 1989-1990**

On 4 February 1988 US federal district courts in Florida issued indictments against General Manuel Antonio Noriega, commander of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF), for drug trafficking. For years Noriega had been a reliable, if somewhat notorious, friend of various US government agencies. After his indictment by the court, Noriega evolved into a bitter enemy of the United States, and relations with Panama rapidly deteriorated.

Just after the issuance of the indictments, Noriega forced the legitimate president of Panama, Eric Delvalle, out of office and installed the Panamanian education minister in his place. Following ensued a period of tension between the PDF and US armed forces personnel in Panama. In April 1989 US marines guarding a fuel depot engaged in a fierce fire-fight with armed intruders, presumed to be PDF. Military personnel and their families were frequently harassed when they traveled off post. As problems grew with Noriega, General Frederick F. Woerner, commander of SOUTHCOM, had gradually increased the strength of US forces in Panama and developed plans for military action in the event the White House, first under President Ronald Reagan, then his successor, George H. W. Bush, decided to take military action.

On 7 May 1989 Guillermo Endara, a critic of Noriega, was elected as the new president of Panama, only to have the PDF commander overturn the results of the election three days later.

In response Bush ordered 2,000 additional US military personnel to Panama and recalled the US ambassador. Eight months later in December 1989, after the PDF killed a marine lieutenant and assaulted a Navy officer and his wife, the president ordered General Maxwell Thurman, new commander of SOUTHCOM, to destroy the PDF and capture Noriega.

On 20 December a joint US force of special operations and conventional units attacked over two dozen targets in Panama. Noriega fled, hid out for several days, and then showed up in the Vatican's *Nunciature*, or embassy. After several days of negotiations, at one point accompanied by loud rock music to mask conversations at the gate from news media, Noriega gave himself up to US authorities. He was subsequently tried, convicted, and sentenced to jail in the United States. By 3 January 1990 all resistance by the PDF had ceased.

Much of the stability and reconstruction operations during and after Operation JUST CAUSE were part of Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY. This plan concentrated on public safety, health issues, and population

control measures, as well as helping the newly appointed government of Panama function efficiently. An important part of the effort was to train the Panamanian police and paramilitary forces that replaced the PDF. The primary organization responsible for executing this plan was the MSG, backed by US forces already stationed in Panama. In January 1991 the group was deactivated, its mission accomplished.

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## **Kuwait and Iraq, post-Operation DESERT STORM**

Following Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, Kuwait maintained close military cooperation with Western countries. In October 1994 the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries came to Kuwait's assistance after Iraq moved 70,000 troops and heavy armor close to the Kuwaiti border. In November 1994 Iraq officially recognized Kuwait's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, as well as its borders as defined by the United Nations.

In the fall and winter of 1997 Saddam Hussein engaged in a series of aggressive acts which threatened regional stability. He violated no-fly zones, threatened to shoot down U2 reconnaissance overflights, and interfered with UN weapons inspection teams. In response the United States executed Operations DESERT THUNDER I and II to provide military presence and capability during negotiations between the UN and Iraq over weapons of mass destruction. The United States and its allies provided more than 35,000 land, sea, and air strike forces, marking the largest multinational force assembled in Southwest Asia since the conclusion of the Gulf War. In addition to the US and coalition forces already in Kuwait, a brigade task force from 3d Infantry Division rapidly deployed to Kuwait. Additional equipment for two more brigades was poised in the Persian Gulf for landing with the maritime pre-position force. The volatile situation was temporarily defused when Iraq agreed to allow uninterrupted resumption of UN weapons inspections.

Despite Hussein's initial agreement to allow UN weapons inspections, Iraq's intransigence and noncompliance with UN Security Council resolutions continued, resulting in the initiation of Operation DESERT FOX in December 1998. On 16 December coalition military forces launched cruise missile attacks against military targets in Iraq. The four-day campaign of airstrikes was designed to deliver a serious blow to Iraq's capability to manufacture, store, maintain and deliver weapons of mass destruction and to Hussein's ability to threaten or otherwise intimidate his neighbors. The airstrikes achieved their objective and Iraq again promised to provide the UN inspection teams with unfettered access to factories and laboratories.

During the 2002-03 build up to and execution of OIF, Kuwait was a vital coalition partner, allowing the staging of coalition troops and equipment and donating upward of \$350 million in assistance, primarily fuel, to the effort. Throughout OIF, Kuwait has been consistently involved in reconstruction efforts in Iraq, pledging \$1.5 billion at the October 2003.

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## **Somalia, 1992-1994**

In December 1992 President George H.W. Bush ordered US forces to lead a multinational coalition to enter the war-torn country of Somalia. The mission was to provide security for humanitarian relief organizations attempting to provide food to the Somali people and to prepare the way for the UN to assume responsibility for the more complex task of nation building. The result was Operation RESTORE HOPE, commanded by US Marine Lieutenant General Robert Johnston. Under Johnston's command were elements of the 1st Marine Division and the Army's 10th Mountain Division, as well as military units from other contributing countries. Confined to the southern third of Somalia, where the country's factional fighting was most intense, the United Task Force (UNITAF) had the firepower to keep the warlords under control while coordinating with aid agencies to distribute food and other supplies to the population at large. Also, as part of the operation, UNITAF forces helped rebuild the Somali police force, politically empower traditional leaders at the local and regional levels, and engage in a number of civic action programs—all of which critics in the Pentagon labeled as “mission creep.” Johnston and his staff, backed by Ambassador Robert Oakley in Somalia, defended each of these initiatives as essential to accomplishing the original mission. On 4 May 1993 Operation RESTORE HOPE formally ended, having successfully achieved its objectives.

UNITAF was succeeded by UN Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). As promised by Bush and honored by Clinton, the United States provided logistical support and a quick reaction force composed of 10th Mountain Division troops to the undertaking. In its efforts to arrange a permanent solution to the Somali conflict, UNOSOM II lacked the military power to engage in effective nation-building activities. This fact was not lost on Somalia's warlords, particularly Mohamed Farah Aideed whose supporters killed and mutilated 24 Pakistani soldiers in early June. From that point on, the principal focus of UNOSOM II was trying to apprehend Aideed and his supporters. Numerous firefights rocked the streets of Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, and Clinton approved deploying US SOF to help track down the warlord. On 3 October 1993 in an operation to capture Aideed, two American helicopters were shot down in Mogadishu and an all-night firefight ensued between US forces and Aideed's militia and followers. When dawn broke the next morning, the American force counted 18 dead and dozens wounded. Somali casualties ran well over 1,000, with between 300 and 500 killed.

Despite the disproportionate casualty ratio, the firefight ignited a po-

litical debate in the United States over whether American forces should be involved in Somalia or not. After a meeting with his national security advisers, Clinton decided to withdraw all US troops by the end of March 1994. However prior to the redeployment date, he reinforced those troops with JTF-Somalia that included armor, artillery, and combat aviation assets. The US withdrawal took place as planned, and the following year, the UN quit the country as well. Not surprisingly, Somalia remained engulfed by political and military turmoil.

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## **Haiti, 1994-1995**

The UN Security Council issued Resolution 940 on 31 July 1994 in response to the continued repression of the people of Haiti. A three-man ruling junta had forced out democratically elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide in a coup in 1991 and had increasingly oppressed the people of Haiti to maintain its hold on power. The UN resolution essentially authorized any means necessary to remove the junta and restore a constitutionally elected administration to govern that Caribbean nation.

The United States soon formed a multinational force (MNF) to carry out the UN's mandate by means of a military intervention. As US armed forces prepared to invade Haiti, on 17 September Clinton sent former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and retired US Army General Colin Powell to convince General Raoul Cédras and the other two members of the junta to step down and allow the return of constitutional rule. Late the following day, knowing that elements of the 82nd Airborne Division were in the air en route to Haiti, Cédras and the others agreed to relinquish power and allow the MNF to peacefully enter the country.

The deploying units of the 82nd were recalled in mid-air, and on 19 September 1994 the first contingents of the US 10th Mountain Division arrived via Blackhawk helicopters at Port-au-Prince. Eventually almost 21,000 multinational troops deployed to Haiti to supervise the transition of power from military rule to a constitutional government. By 15 October the junta members had departed and Aristide was restored to his position as president.

Over the next 18 months, the MNF and CTF 180 and JTF 190 embarked on a series of efforts to restore law and order and return a sense of normalcy to Haiti. Key actions included patrolling the streets of the capital and other large cities, professionalizing the Haitian police and army, providing humanitarian assistance, and disarming and neutralizing paramilitary forces. On 31 March 1995 the United States handed over control of the MNF to the UN.

The US and MNF efforts in Haiti in 1994 and 1995 were successful in temporarily creating a secure environment and, with a great deal of foreign aid dollars, a partially restored infrastructure. However, the outside effort did not train and educate the Haitian people to maintain the nation's stability and infrastructure, nor has Haiti's elected leaders made much progress in that direction. One could argue that Haiti is better off today than it was under the junta, but in reality, that is not saying much given the continued economic depression that still grips that country. In 2004 another multi-

national coalition, including US Marines, entered Haiti to restore order in the midst of civil disturbances. In early 2006, however, the country again held presidential elections.

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## **The Balkans 1995-Present**

NATO imposed a cease-fire in 1995 ending a destructive four-year war in the Balkans. With the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace on 14 December of that year, the United States deployed US Army forces to Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

Within 65 days of notification, the US Army Europe (USAREUR) moved more than 25,000 troops, 11,000 vehicles, and the equipment and supplies to sustain them more than 1,000 kilometers across former Warsaw Pact countries and into the operational sector. This was completed in spite of the flooding of the Sava River, a French rail strike, an anti-nuclear protester who shut down the German rail system for two days, and the cold of a harsh Balkan winter. To move this force, USAREUR employed 358 trains with 6,800 rail cars, 500 buses, and 1,600 trucks, while US Air Force strategic airlift conducted 1,300 sorties. In the United States, nearly 1,200 soldiers from the US Army Reserve were mobilized and deployed in support of the operation. Most of these reservists were deployed to Bosnia or Germany to provide support to forward-deployed European-based units.

The 1st Armored Division formed the backbone of the US Army forces under the designation Task Force (TF) Eagle. This task force was supported and augmented by elements from the US V Corps and was joined by Nordic-Polish, Turkish, and Russian brigades. In all, 12 nations provided troops: Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Poland, Denmark, Lithuania, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Russia, Turkey and the United States. TF Eagle was charged with enforcing the cease-fire, supervising the marking of boundaries and the zone of separation between the former warring factions, enforcing the withdrawal of the combatants to their barracks, and moving heavy weapons to designated storage sites. In addition to land mine removal, TF Eagle also supported the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's efforts to administer the country's first ever democratic national elections.

On 10 November 1996 the 1st Armored Division was replaced by the 1st Infantry Division, but the mission of TF Eagle continued. When demonstrations in the villages of Celic and Gajevi erupted, the soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division skillfully intervened and quickly brought this very intense situation under control. On 20 December 1996 the Implementation Force (IFOR) mission came to a successful conclusion, and the 1st Infantry Division remained in Bosnia as part of the new Stabilization Force (SFOR). The conclusion of the IFOR mission marked the conclusion of

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. The ongoing SFOR mission is known as Operation JOINT GUARD. This decision brought to a close the mission of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR and has been the beginning for the current operation known as Operation JOINT GUARD.

In the years since the start of JOINT GUARD, various US Army units have deployed to the region to continue the work of TF Eagle. Through careful planning and skillful execution of every mission, American and coalition soldiers have continued to monitor the militaries of the former warring factions and provided a climate of stability in the war-torn land of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The mission is periodically assessed and the force commitment is adjusted as current circumstances require.

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